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Notes
PRovABILITY O LANDLORD'S CLAIM IN BANKRUPTCY WHERE LEASE CONTAINS
COVENANT FOR STIPULATED DAMAGES
ExHAusTvE discussion of the subject of provability in bankruptcy of landlords'
claims for unaccrued rent1 necessitates only a brief resume of the previous state
of the law as an introduction to a treatment of recent statutory and judicial pro-
nouncements. The status of landlords' claims depended upon the construction of
Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act.2 Subsection (a)(1) provided for the provability
of claims "absolutely owing at the time of the filing of the petition." The federal
courts almost unanimously held rent claims not provable3 on the ground that,
historically, rent was a return for occupation, and thus became "absolutely owing"
only at the expiration of each rental period during the life of the lease.4 Conse-
quently, landlords sought to insure the provability of their claims by means of a
covenant to that effect embodied in the lease. It was believed that this would be
a solution to their problem in view of Section 63(a)(4) which embraced within
the ambit of provable debts such claims as are "founded upon a contract express
or implied." 5 Such a contract of lease, as ordinarily drawn, reserved in the landlord
a right of re-entry and required from the lessee a covenant of indemnity for all
loss of future rent caused by bankruptcy. But the courts again branded the claim
contingent for the reason that at the time of filing the petition it was uncertain
whether the option thus reserved by the lessor would be exercised.0 This ruling
1. Schwabacher and Weinstein, Rent Claims in Bankruptcy (1933) 33 CoL. L. RLV.
213; Radin, Claims for Unaccrued Rent in Bankruptcy (1933) 21 CAL. L. REV. 561, 22
id. 1; Fallen, Lessors as Creditors in Bankruptcy (1934) 4 BRooxLY L. Rzv. 11; Note
(1934) 47 HtAv. L. REV. 488; Note (1934) 20 VA. L. Rxv. 358; cf. Douglas and Frank,
Landlords' Claims in Reorganization (1933) 42 YA.E L. J. 1003; Schmitt, Rights o1 the
Landlord (1933) 5 Miss. L. J. 147.
2. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1926).
3. In re Mahler, 105 Fed. 428 (E. D. Mich. 1900); In re Hays, Foster & Ward Co.,
117 Fed. 879 (W. D. Ky. 1902); Watson v. Merrill, 136 Fed. 359 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905);
Gnamr's COLLIER, BANxRUPTcY (3d ed. 1934) 998. For.a complete collection of author-
ities, see Schwabacher and Weinstein, supra note 1, at 215, n. 6.
4. See Ex parte Houghton, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6,725, at 585. The historical lease doc-
trine was reasserted by the Supreme Court in several dicta. Thus in Central Trust Co.
v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S. 581, 590 (1916), the Court painstakingly pointed out
that a contract of lease is distinguishable from an ordinary executory contract because
of the "diversity between duties which touch the realty and the mere personalty," quoting
Co. Lrrr., 292, b, § 513. And Mr. Justice Holmes declared in Gardiner v. Butler, 245
U. S. 603, 605 (1918), that "the law as to leases is not a matter of logic in vacuo; it
is a matter of history that has not forgotten Lord Coke."
5. For an excellent discussion of the effect of covenants, see Schwabacher and Wein-
stein, supra note 1, at 241. And see Comment (1934) 32 Micir. L. Rav. 664, 667,
6. In re Ells, 98 Fed. 967 (D. Mass. 1900); In re Roth & Appel, 181 Fed. 667 (C. C. A.
2d, 1910); Slocum v. Soliday, 183 Fed. 410 (C. C. A. 1st, 1910). But in the cases of
In re Mullings Clothing Co., 238 Fed. 58 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916) and In re National Credit
Clothing Co., 66 F. (2d) 371 (C. C. A. 7th, 1933) the claims were held provable because
the leases had been repudiated before the filing of the petition.
was approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Manhattan Properties v. Irnng
Trust Co. 7 When dealing with rent claims the Supreme Court thus read into
Subdivision (4) the limitation expressed in Subdivison (1), although in other situa-
tions it has apparently departed from this strict construction 8
The courts apparently experienced little difficulty in placing their conclusion on
technical grounds. But in reaching a decision they were confronted by opposing
considerations of policy. To disallow the claim, in the case of a defunct corpora-
tion, deprives the landlord of his only remedy for the loss caused to him by the
bankruptcy.9 And in the case of an individual bankrupt, the failure to discharge
a large rent claim contravenes the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act' 0 by burdening
the bankrupt with a continuing liability. But if rent claims were provable, the
enormous claims of landlords would substantially deplete the assets to the detriment
of other creditors. Secondly, such claims might be disproportionate to the actual
damage in the event of a subsequent rise in rental values. Thirdly, the landlord,
unlike the other creditors, has been compensated for the occupation of his premises
up to bankruptcy, and the unexpired term has in no way benefited the assets of
the bankrupt estate." The position taken by the Supreme Court indicates that it
believed the latter considerations outweighed the former.
At the present term, however, a different result was reached by the Supreme
Court in Irving Trust Co. v. Perryj2 In that case the lease stipulated that the
filing of any petition in bankruptcy should ipso facto constitute a breach of the
lease, and the lessor should forthwith be entitled to recover damages in an amount
equal to the rent reserved for the residue of the term less the fair rental value.
The court held the claim provable within the meaning of Section 63(a)(1) on the
ground that it accrued at the moment of filing the petition and that a reasonable
formula was indicated by the parties for ascertaining the damages.
7. 291 U. S. 320 (1934). At p. 333, the Court by negative implication intimated that
a claim might be provable if the lease expressly made the filing of the petition ipzo facto
a breach and provided as a measurement of damages the difference between the present
value of the remainder of the term and the total rent to fall due in the future.
The Court held that Section 74(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 47 SrTT. 1467 (1933), 11
U. S. C. A. § 202(a) (1934 Supp.), which provided that a rent claim in compositions and
extensions "shall constitute a provable debt and shall be liquidated under Section 63(b)"
was not intended to alter the effect of Section 63(a).
8. Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S. 581 (1916) (bankruptcy held
to be anticipatory breach of an executory contract to pay annually for a baggage privilege) ;
Maynard v. Elliott, 283, U. S. 273 (1931) (claim against indomer of a promis-ory note
held provable, although neither dishonor nor notice of presentment had been waived).
9. This problem has become of special significance in the last few years. The depres-
sion, bringing in its wake a substantial decrease in rental values, led many chain stores
to resort to bankruptcy in order to avoid burdensome leases. See Douglas and Frank,
supra note 1, at 1003; Comment (1934) 32 MicH. L. RPv. 664, 670; Smith, Chain Stores
and the Lease Plague (1932) 58 FnucmA'. WoRLD 367.
As a result of the rule denying provability, the landlord would obtain nothing ei-en
when, as in the case of some chain stores, merchandise creditors collected their full claims
and additional funds remained in the bankrupt estate. Burmr.s WErM, May 26, 1934, p. 10.
10. See Central Trust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U. S. 581, 591 (1916).
11. Cf. Trust Co. of Georgia v. Whitehall Holding Co., 53 F. (2d) 635 (C. C. A. 5th,
1931); In re Metropolitan Chain Stores, 66 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); In re
Liggett Co., 7 F. Supp. 855 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Fallon, supra note 1, at 30.
12. 55 Sup. Ct. 150 (1934). The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals, 69 F. (2d)
90 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) is noted in (1934) 32 M]cm L. REv. 691.
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It is difficult to discover any real distinction between the lease in the Manhattan
Properties case and that in the Perry case. The Court declared that the claim was
free from contingency because by the terms of the lease it did not depend upon
the exercise of an option by the lessor. But this distinction is at best a highly
technical one, since even in the Manhattan Properties case the Court might have
recognized that realistically the landlord would be compelled to exercise his option.
1"
Clearly, the fundamental objections to allowing provability in the Manhattan Prop-
erties case are equally valid here. The claim may be inordinately large, depending
on the length of the term; it is equally speculative; and it does not flow from such
past consideration as may have added to the distributive assets of the estate. Appar-
ently, therefore, the Court has been led to transform an otherwise non-provable
claim into a provable one merely because of a difference in verbiage. It is of
course true that the legal effect of contractual obligations in all leases is determined
by the specific language employed. And it is equally true that the fact that rights
of third persons are affected by a contract is usually not a reason for refusal of
judicial enforcement thereof. But ordinarily an agreement contained in a lease is
a result of a bargain concluded between the landlord and the lessee. In the present
situation, however, no real bargain is to be found, since the landlord can easily per-
suade the lessee to allow the insertion of a covenant for stipulated damages. For
obviously, the lessee is in no respect injured, since the landlord's claim, if allowed,
will be restricted to the assets of the bankrupt estate, in which the lessee will no
longer have a beneficial interest; he will, in fact, be benefited by the discharge,
The result of a holding such as that in the Perry case, therefore, 'is to permit a
landlord, by his own act, to prejudice the interests of other creditors of the lessee.
14
Whether or not landlords' claims for unaccrued rent should be allowed in the absence
of such a clause is another question. But once provability was denied, the Supreme
Court should not have admitted an exception merely because the landlord insisted
that a particular form of words be included in the lease.1
The limitations of the judicial process compel the courts to choose between
allowing provability of the whole claim or denying it altogether. But the legislative
process, fortunately, is not similarly restricted. This is illustrated by the 1934
amendment to Section 63(a) of the Bankruptcy Act.10 The new Subdivision (7)
purports to effect a compromise of the conflicting considerations of policy through
partial allowance of landlords' claims. It provides that claims for damages for
future rents shall be provable in an amount not exceeding the rent reserved for
one year following the surrender of the premises.' 7 As a consequence of the action
13. Cf. Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918); see In re Metropolitan Chain
Stores, 66 F. (2d) 485, 486 (C. C. A. 2d, 1933); (1934) 28 Iu. L. Rv. 963, 964.
14. See In re Leslie & Griffith Co., 230 Fed. 465, 467 (D. Mass. 1916), aff'd 251 Fed.
268 (C. C. A. 1st, 1918); dissenting opinion in Taylor Trust Co. v. Kothe, 30 F. (2d)
77, 80 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929), rev'd 280 U. S. 224 (1930); Schwabacher and Weinstein,
supra note 1, at 241, n. 117; 47 HARv. L. RExv. 488, 493.
15. The result of the principal case presents an interesting paradox. If the courts
had originally ruled that a landlord's claim was provable, his claim would be for the
loss in future rentals occasioned by the bankruptcy. Yet the principal case distinguishes
the former rule and accords provability merely because the lessee has covenanted to be
liable for precisely the same measure of damages for which landlords have heretofore
asked and been denied relief in the absence of such a covenant.
16. 48 STAT. 923, 991, 11 U. S. C. A. § 103 (1934 Supp.). This amendment Is in-
applicable to the principal case since it provides that it shall only affect "estates pending
on June 7, 1934, in which the time for filing such claims has not expired."
17. In Section 77 B(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 48 STAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A. § 207
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taken by Congress the decision in the principal case may be of merely academic
interesL s Since no decisions have as yet been rendered under this amendment,
any discussion as to its possible interpretation is at most speculative. But the
problem arises whether a landlord's claim based upon a lease like that in the Perry
case will be allowed in full or limited to a single year's rent. The principal case
might support the theory that the new subdivision included in Section 63 merely
provides for claims which hitherto have been held not provable. On this reasoning,
claims based on such express covenants as have been provable even before the
amendment, are not affected and should be allowable in full. Such a result would
defeat the manifest intent of Congress to solve the whole problem by effecting a
reasonable compromise. Consequently, the courts should hold that the amendment
applies to all claims for unaccrued rent regardless of the form of the lease or
covenants.
PROPERTY IN RADIo BROADCAST PROGRAMS
T=r Texas Company, as part of a national advertising scheme, hired the facilities
of the National Broadcasting Company and entered into a contract with Ed Wynn
to render services as an artist one half-hour each week. Wynn's remuneration was
to be $3500 for each performance alone, and $5000 if he also furnished the script.
He was to be assisted by Graham MacNamee, a well-known radio announcer, whose
name therefore appeared in the script to indicate his lines. Wynn rendered the
programs duly and according to his contract of employment, but he also assigned
to Uproar Company the right to publish in pamphlet form the subject matter of
his broadcasts. Uproar Company published these, sold them, and advertised over
the radio that they were to be obtained simultaneously with the broadcasting of
the program. The Texas Company and the National Broadcasting Company en-
deavored to prevent this advertising by pressure of an undisclosed kind against the
radio stations employed to advertise the pamphlet, whereupon Uproar Company
sought to enjoin the efforts of the Texas Company and the National Broadcasting
Company on grounds of conspiracy. The defendants interposed an equitable de-
fense and in turn sought a counter injunction forbidding the plaintiff to ue the
manuscript. The latter relief was granted.'
Such a case is typical of how, when a new industry like radio-broadcasting springs,
up in a decade from nothing to national importance, there arise immense new values,
the property rights in which are not determined either by custom or contract. In
the present case the advertiser bought and obtained advertising value, while the
(b) (1934 Supp.), dealing with corporate reorganizations, the maximum pariod allowed
is three years. Perhaps more liberal treatment is accorded landlords in reorganization
proceedings in order to induce them to accept the proposed plan.
18. The amendment, the effects of which are so beneficial in sterilizing the undeirable
consequences of the Perry case, will of course be inapplicable in the case of equity re-
ceiverships, where a clause similar to that in the Perry case has been held to allow
provability, although in the absence of such a clause, the landlord's claim has been denied.
Filene's Sons Co. v. Weed, 245 U. S. 597 (1918); Gardner v. Butler, 245 U. S. 693 (1918).
Presumably the result wUll be that creditors in receivership cases, where the lease contains
a clause similar to that in the Filene case, will be impelled to throw the debtor into
bankruptcy in order to forestall the advantage that will otherwise accrue to the landlord.




artist furnished a program which aided in popularizing what the advertiser was
selling. In doing this a by-product of apparent value, the script of the broadcast
program, was produced.2 There is no doubt that Wynn might have contracted with
the Texas Company either to retain the rights to the script or to convey them
entirely to his employer, but apparently neither party thought of the matter. The
trial-court decided that the script was the property of the employer, the Texas
Company. In part the decision was based upon the argument that since Wynn was
to receive $3500 for broadcasting, or $5000 for broadcasting and furnishing a script,
it was fair to infer an intention that $1500 was paid outright for the script. These
same facts, however, would equally support an argument to the effect that the $1500
was paid Wynn to permit him to hire persons who could write, or help him write,
the script and to save the Texas Company the equal or greater expense of having
the work done, and that the use of the script at the broadcast was all that was
contemplated. The court analogized the case to those which hold that when an
employee in the course of his employment invents something useful or used in that
employment, it is the property of his employer 3-a doctrine that has been extended
in at least one instance to the case of an artist creating something on commission
for his patron.4 This merely shifts the ground of inference from intent to scope
of employment, which was not defined by the contract. Yet in the absence of con-
trolling factors there is no reason to question this result, which is as reasonable as
any other.
If the script was the property of the Texas Company, the assignment made by
Wynn had no effect, and the Uproar Company plainly could not publish, sell or
advertise it as long as the Texas Company retained control of it. Such common
law protection of ownership in manuscripts has been acknowledged since the eighteenth
century.5 But this protection continues only so long as the owner has not made
2. The process of preparing a radio program is remarkably like that by which Eliza-
bethan plays were produced. Some member or members of the theatrical company or
some hireling hack-writer would write parts designed to adapt the latest popular fad for
the special abilities of the various actors or even for some special piece of stage property
which the company might happen to possess. While some pains were taken to prevent
rival companies from stealing plays in process of production, no thought was given to
the literary or monetary value of the play scripts themselves. These, when they were
printed and sold at all, were in pirated editions, and the usual excuse for an authentic
edition was to correct the many errors spread by the unauthorized editions. Ben Jonson
incurred much ridicule by publishing his own plays as "works," thus ascribing to them
an independent literary value.
In the field of Radio there are many manuscripts created and used whose intrinsic
value is slight. But some productions might conceivably have subsequent value for mov-
ing picture, magazine or publication purposes.
3. The doctrine is most forcefully stated in Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U. S. 52, 60
(1924): "Peck, therefore, virtually asserts, though stimulated to services and paid for
them-doing nothing more than he was engaged to do and paid for doing-that the
product of the services was so entirely his property that he might give as great a right
to any member of the mechanical world as the one who engaged him and paid him-a
'right to be used in competition with the one who engaged him and paid him. We cannot
assent to this.' Cf. Solomons v. United States, 137 U. S. 342 (1890); Gill v. United
States, 160 U. S. 426 (1896).
4. Dielman v. White, 102 Fed. 892 (D. Mass. 1900).
5. Forrester v. Waller, 2 Bro. P. C. 138 (1741); Duke of Queensberry v. Shebbeare,
2 Eden 329 (1758); Maclcin v. Richardson, Arnb. 694 (Ch. 1770); Thompson v. Stanhope,
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such a use of his manuscript as will be deemed "publication," which is said to
constitute an abandonment or relinquishment to the public.0 Thus the question
remains as to whether the broadcasting of this uncopyrighted material would be
such a use of it as to "place it in the public domain" and thus end the common
law restrictions against general use. While it seems to be imposible to print and
sell to the public without thereby "publishing," the theory that it was not neces-
sarily publication for the owner of a manuscript to impart its contents to an
audience has led courts to permit a large variety of uses to be made of a manuscript
without the sacrifice of common law protection.7 Thus the reading of a play or a
book to a private audience was from the beginning given as an example of no
publication, and the reading of lectures by a professor to his class was held not
to relinquish any rights therein.8 One of the earliest English decisions and one
in 1912 by our own Supreme Court made the rule broad enough to permit them
to hold that performance of a play in a public theatre did not of itself constitute pub-
licationP To extend the doctrine of the theatre cases to radio broadcasts would
not, if the extension were otherwise desirable, seem an undue use of the judicial
imagination. Save that the audience are in their own homes and infinitely more
numerous than in a theatre, a program such as Ed Wynn's closely approximates
a stage performance by the same comedian.10 Another argument, although more
Amb. 737 (Ch. 1774) (case of Lord Chesterfield's letters to his son). Cf. Donaldson v.
Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (K. B. 1774). This decision is cited in later cases for holding that
an author has no common law protection after publication. The case as reported is not
very satisfactory. It is a list of questions answered in seriatim opinions by eleven judge.
who fail to establish clearly any legal theory. It raises, without satisfactorily answering,
the problem whether before the copyright statute of 8 Alma, c. 19 (1709), common law
may or may not have protected an author's exclusive rights to print and publish in
perpetuity, although it makes quite certain that if such right ever existed, the copyright
statute removed it. The tendency to seek special statutory protection for something
which may have been latently protected by common law is so usual a phenomenon as
to need no comment. It is possible, however, that mere logical notions as to the mean-
ing of publication, ie. that its very meaning implied an abandonment, would have prevented
the development of a "common law copyright" for published material. For an interesting
discussion of the Donaldson case, see Jeffries v. Boosey, 4 It. L. Cas. 81S, 4 (1854).
6. Ferris v. Frohlman, 223 U. S. 424 (1912); Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326 (1837).
7. See Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326, 343 (1887): "It is settled law that upon
communication being made to the public, whether orally or by the circulation of written
or printed copies, the author's right of property ceases to exist . . . but the author
may communicate it to others with limitations and restrictions which he may enforce.
He cannot print and sell without publishing, but may impose restrictions to prevent it
publication . . . such as giving copies for private perusal or recital before a s0ect
audience."
8. Caird v. Sime, 12 App. Cas. 326 (18S7). This case, in deciding that cla -room
lectures did not constitute publication, distinguished them from public lectures given by
the University. It was held that these implied publication.
9. Macklin v. Richardson, Amb. 694 (Ch. 1770); Ferris v. Frohman, 223 U. S. 424
(1912). See p. 435, Ferris v. Frohman, .supra: "It has been said that the owner of a
play cannot complain if the piece is reproduced from memory . . . but the distinction
is without sound basis and has been repudiated." Cf. Boucicalt v. Chatterton, 9 Ch.
D. 276 (1876).
10. It is unimportant that, in a theatrical performance, there is a ticl:et of admis-'on
and a pecuniary consideration for the same. In a series of copyright cases, it was neces-
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artificial, may be made that a broadcast is not a "public performance." The
Supreme Court, in deciding that the operator of a receiving set is not listening to
the original performance but to a reproduction like that of a phonograph record11
seems to have implied quite plainly that a broadcast is like the making of a record
to set the phonographic diaphragm in oscillation,' 2 which is not publication. Nor
is the performance in the broadcasting studio necessarily any more a public per-
formance than reading a manuscript to a private audience. Under this view the
use of broadcasting script could be enjoined regardless of when it was used or of
whether or not it appeared that its value was derived from association with a
particular person or program.
There are strong reasons for utilizing these existing legal principles to govern a
situation like that of the instant case. Failure to do so would leave to the radio
industry the sole alternative of compliance with copyright requirements, for only
in this manner could they secure protection from reproduction of "published"
manuscripts. The present copyright statute was designed for past needs, and for
a different economic organization of authorship; it is antiquated, cumbrous, and
admittedly in need of drastic revision.13 It is hardly desirable to force a vast
body of amorphous material upon the time of governmental officials when only
a small portion of that material will ever be the subject of litigation. And whie
the registration provisions of the copyright act are useful evidence of the exact
words and sense of a manuscript and of its date of creation when these facts are
brought into issue by a plagiarism suit, this is not reason enough for denying all
other protection in the absence of satisfactory Congressional action upon the subject.
The conduct enjoined in the present case presented a further question than pro-
tection of the intrinsic value of the script. There is another value which might
be termed the current or adventitious value, derived from the circumstances of
the broadcast-the publicity and good will attained and paid for by the Texas
Company through its contract with Wynn and the National Broadcasting Company.
sary to decide whether performance of copyright music in a restaurant [Herbert v.
Shanley, 242 U. S. 591 (1917)], or in a radio broadcasting station maintained by a de-
partment store [Witmark v. Bamberger, 291 Fed. 776, (D. N. J. 1923)], was a public
performance for profit, when no tickets of admission were sold and no profits directly
realized from the performance. These cases, by analogy, close the door to argument that
Ed Wynn's radio broadcast is unlike his stage performance because of the absence of box-
office receipts.
11. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Co., 283 U. S. 191 (1931). The same theory is held by
an English court in Performing Right Society v. Hammond's Bradford Brewery Co. Ltd.,
49 T. L. R. 410 (Ch. 1933).
12. See Sprague, Copyright-Radio and the Jewell-LaSalle Case (1932) 3 Am L. REv.
417, 421: "Can it be that the Supreme Court has in mind that the broadcaster may
not in all cases be performing? In view of this decision, where does the public per-
formance take place? Certainly not in the studio for that is a private performance
only . . . The broadcaster does not publicly perform for profit because the Supreme
Court has ruled that the public does not receive the broadcaster's performance but a
reproduction of it which the listener creates through the medium of his receiving set.
The broadcaster is in the same position as any manufacturer of phonograph records,"
13. For discussion of the application of copyright law to radio broadcasting, see
Caldwell, International Protection of Broadcasters against Commercial Users of Their Pro-
grams (1932) 2 J. RADro L. 479, 505; Caldwell, Piracy of Radio Broadcast Programs
(1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 1087, 1098; Simpson, Copyright Situation as Affecting Radio Broad.
casting (1931) 9 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rzv. 181.
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This value attaches to the script where, as here, it is used in such a manner as
to associate the publication with the broadcast in the minds of the public; it is
even more dearly illustrated by those issues of the case turning on the name
"Graham," which has no intrinsic or literary worth. The name "Graham" that
appeared in the script, under the circumstances rightly believed by the public to
mean the popular announcer Graham MacNamee, has such adventitious value, the
rights to which were reserved to the National Broadcasting Company by contracL
This type of interest has previously been protected by the courts because it is felt
that its exploitation is an unfair trade practice within the doctrine of the Inter-
national News Case.' 4 In that case the relief granted was based in part upon the
injustice of permitting the commercially profitable use of a value obtained by
another's exertions without compensation or authorization. Similarly it has been
held an unfair trade practice to bind one's own advertising sheets in a well known
directory' 5 or newspaper'0 in order to profit by the name and reputation of the
real owner of that value. The conduct is illegal, not because demonstrable damage
thereby results to the owner, but for the reason that exploitation of values created
by others, when the exploitation is direct and obvious, conflicts with current views
of morality. Practices such as those of the Uproar Company in the instant case
might well be considered essentially similar in effect and intention. Under this
view it might be possible to establish that even had the script itself been validly
assigned or had a separate script been obtained not similar enough to justify any
allegation of literary theft, but similar enough to be associated with or to profit
by the popularity of the broadcast, publication by Uproar Company could have
been enjoined.
PowER or BANxuupTcY COURT UNDER SECTION 77 To RESTRAIN SALE OF COLL ATRAL
PLEDGED By DEBTOR
ThE Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad pledged large blocks of its own
mortgage bonds and those of its subsidiaries as security for loans made to it by the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and several large banks, under an agreement
by which the pledgees were given a power of sale without notice upon the pledgor's
insolvency or default.' More than four months after giving the security, the pledgor
filed a petition for reorganization under Section 77 of the 1933 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act, 2 which provides for railroad reorganization 3 and gives the bank-
14. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U. S. 21S (191S).
15. National Telephone Directory Co. v. Dawson Manufacturing Co., 214 Mo. App.
683, 263 S. W. 483 (1924).
16. Press Publishing Co. v. Levi Bros. & Co., N. Y. Special Term, N. Y. L. J, December
20, 1912, cited in Caldwell, Piracy of Broadcast Programs (1930) 30 COL. L. Rxv. 1037,
1110, and quoted in National Telephone Directory Co. v. Dawson Manufacturing Co.,
supra note 15. Cf. Federal Electric Co., Inc. v. Flexlume Corporation, 33 F. (2d) 412 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1929).
1. In re Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Rr. Co., 72 F. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934),
cert. granted, 55 Sup. Ct. 213, 214, 215 (1934). The railroad had borrowed approximately
17 million dollars, secured by collateral of a face value of over 54 millions, most of the
debt being owed to the R. F. C.
2. 47 STAT. 1474-77 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205 (1934). For comprehensive dis-
cussions of Section 77 see Garrison, Reorganization of Railroads Under The Baniruplcy
Act (1933) 1 U. or CH. L. R v. 71; Lowenthal, The Railroad Reorganrkation Act (1933)
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ruptcy court "exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever lo-
cated. '" 4 The petition stated that the railroad would be unable to meet the obliga-
tions for which the security was pledged, which were about to mature, and asked
an injunction against the sale of the collateral by the pledgee. In affirming a re-
straining order granted by the district court, the circuit court of appeals held that
the debtor's equity in the pledged collateral was property of the debtor within the
meaning of Section 77, and that jurisdiction over such property gave the court
power to issue a restraining order against sale by the pledgee; 5 the injunction was
said not to interfere with the pledgee's unquestioned right to the property, but
merely to postpone the exercise of his remedy.
If a pledgee of the debtor's securities were free to exercise a power of sale at his
discretion after reorganization proceedings have begun, an obvious handicap to the
effective formulation and administration of a reorganization plan, which Section 77
is designed to promote, would doubtless be interposed. This is particularly true
where the pledged bonds are the debtor's own obligations, because their sale would
constitute any purchasers a new class of creditors whose claims must be provided
for in the reorganization plan on the basis of the full face value of the bonds, and
whose consent to the particular plan of reorganization must be procured.( Yet, on
47 ITA v. L. Rv. 18; Rogers and Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Under
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 571; Wehle, Railroad Reorgan-
ization Under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act (1934) 44 Yt-LE L. 3. 197; Weiner, Re-
organization Under Section 77 (1933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 834.
3. That the bankruptcy power of Congress is constitutionally broad enough to allow
legislation providing for the relief of debtors without liquidating their assets or discharging
their debts seems fairly certain. See Sturges v. Crownshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 195 (U. S.
1799); Canada Southern Rr. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527, 535 (1883); Hanover National
Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181, 186 (1902). Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act has been
held constitutional in the lower courts over the objection that a statute providing for an
extension of time for the payment of debts is not a bankruptcy statute. In re Landquist,
70 F. (2d5 929 (C. C. A. 7th, 1934). See also Garrison, The Power of Congress Over
Corporate Reorganization (1933) 19 VA. L. Rv. 343; Rosenberg, A New Scheme of
Reorganization (1917) 17 CoL. L. Rzv. 523; Swaine, Reorganization-The Next Step;
Reply to Rosenberg (1922) 22 Coi. L. Rv. 121.
4. Section 77(a), 47 STAr. 1474 (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205(a) (1934). The purpose
of this section was to extend the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court territorially to avoid
the necessity for bringing ancillary proceedings. See 76 CoNo. Rzec. 2927, 4880 (1933);
Billig, Corporate Reorganization-Equity vs. Bankruptcy, (1933) 17 Mimir. L. REv. 237,
255. And see articles cited supra note 2.
S. The court not only held that the restraining order could thus be issued, but that It
could be issued in summary proceedings. The usual rule is that when there is an adverse
claim to property not within the actual or constructive possession of the debtor or trustee,
and the latter claims the property as assets of the debtor, the rights to such property
must be determined in plenary proceedings. Bardes v. Hawarden Bank, 178 U. S. 524
(1900) ; Taubel Scott v. Fox, 264 U. S. 426 (1924). But if the trustee has possession
of the property, the court can adjudicate rights with respect thereto in summary pro-
ceedings. Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102 (1910); In re Hoey, 290 Fed. 116 (C. C, A.
2d, 1923).
6. A reorganization plan as provided by Section 77 includes a proposal to modify or
alter the rights of secured as well as unsecured creditors, and such plan must be approved
by creditors of each class holding at least two-thirds in amount of claims of that class.
The bonds held by the pledgee as security for the principal obligation represent no lndebt.
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the other hand, by granting a restraining order, it is arguable that the court is in
effect nullifying the essence of the pledge contract, since the pledgee is restrained
from liquidating the pledge on default in the principal indebtednes. 7 The ability
of corporations in a financially precarious situation to procure loans through the
pledge of security is considered by some to rest almost wholly on the fact that
the pledgee lender, by reason of his discretionary power of sale, obtains as security
assets capable of quick liquidation s The argument of the court that the restraint
of the exercise of this power of sale merely affects the "remedy" of the pledgee
rather than any substantial "right" may, from this point of view, seem unrealistic.
In appraising the effect of the decision, therefore, the possibility cannot be over-
looked that it may induce a tightening of credit since banks or financing companies
may hesitate to loan money to corporations in process or contemplation of reor-
ganization because of their lack of assurance as to the liquidity of the pledged se-
curity, resulting from judicial supervision over the power of sale.0
Although the facilitation of reorganization proceedings may seem sufficiently de-
sirable to risk producing such an effect, there are yet some pertinent legal questions
as to the power of the court to issue the injunction. It is well settled that the
pledgee's "right" to possession of the collateral under a valid pledge agreement
edness on the part of the debtor. The pledgee's claim under the reorganization plan would
be based on the principal obligation, since in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings his rights
as a claimant against the general assets of the debtor are measured by the amount of the
principal obligation. Pattberg v. Pattberg, 55 N. J. Eq. 604, 38 At!. 205 (1897). But
if the pledgee sells the bonds, the purchasers thereof may enforce the bonds for their full
face value. Wheelwright v. St. Louis, New Orleans & Ocean Canal Transportation Co.,
56 Fed. 164 (C. C. E. D. La. 1893). This is true even if the pledgee himself buys the
bonds. Turner v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 207 Fed. 495 (C. C. A. 9th, 1913).
7. See In re Ward, 104 Fed. 985, 986, 987 (D. Mass. 1900): "The District Court is
without jurisdiction to take property alleged to belong to the bankrupt out of the po-
session of a third party, as well temporarily and by summary process as permanently
and by plenary suit . ..To take property out of a man's possession and to restrain
him from dealing with it as owner, appear to me but different acts of exercise of the
same jurisdiction!'
8. See In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
9. See S=. RyE. No. 1215 (on H. R. 14359) 72nd Cong., 2nd S-ss. (1933) 5. In noting
an amendment to the part of the bill which subsequently was enacted as Section 74, that
the jurisdiction of the court to compromise claims of creditors applied only to "s ecured
debts, the security for which is in the actual or constructive posse sion of the debtor or
of the custodian or receiver," the report states: "It was believed that if every form of
collateral that was deposited as a security for a loan should be subject to review by the
court in any proceedings under this act it could but result in a greater value of collateral
being required by the person or institution granting the loan in the first instance. The
tendency would be to further restrict credit."
The importance of a determination of the question involved in this case is evidenced
by the vast amount of money loaned under pledge agreements. In 1932 alone the rail-
roads of the country issued over $1,000,000,000 of mortgage bonds, approximately S0 p2r
cent of which were pledged by them to secure total borrowings of about 6S 0,0,30..
Hatch, Corporations Pledging Their Own Bonds (1934) 47 H~nv. L. RLv. 1093, 1095.
Furthermore, it is possible that the reasoning of the present case might be carried over to
cases arising under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, relating to corporate reorgan-
ization other than railroads. P. L. No. 296, 73d Cong:, 2nd Sass. (1934).
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is unimpeachable.10 Possession is said to be the criterion of jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts over property of the debtor, and the pledgor has no possession
nor right to possession of the pledged property itself unless he redeems it.11 Prior
to the enactment of Section 77, the Supreme Court and most other courts held,
therefore, that no jurisdiction existed to restrain a pledgee from exercising his power
of sale even subsequent to the pledgor's bankruptcy, 12 except in special circum-
stances. 18 A few courts, however, have held, as in the instant case, that the
debtor's equity in the pledged property when brought under the supervision of the
bankruptcy court was a sufficient basis for jurisdiction to issue an injunction against
the sale of the pledge, and have enjoined a sale to protect the equity.14 Further-
more, in support of this latter conclusion, the fact that the pledged collateral con-
sisted of the debtor's own obligations has been asserted as an additional reason for
enjoining a sale of the collateral by the pledgee, 1' although in this class of cases
such a conclusion is infrequent.' 6 It has, moreover, been pointed out, as sustaining
10. In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905); In re Mayer,
157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); In re Hudson River Navigation Corp. 57 F. (2d) 175
(C. C. A. 2d, 1932); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C, C. A. 7th,
1932) (receivership of pledgor).
11. 36 STAT. 842-12 (1910), 11 U. S. C. A. § 107(d) (1927). The trustee takes only the
same rights with respect to the property as the pledgor had. In re Mertens, 144 Fed. 818
(C. C. A. 2d, 1906); In re Hudson River Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d,
1932); BooNz, LAW OF MORTGAGES (1886) § 308; JoNms, CoLLATERAL Sacumrxss (3d ed.
1912) § 553.
12. Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28 (1907). See also In re Browne, 104 Fed.
762 (E. D. Pa. 1900); In re Mayer, 157 Fed. 836 (C. C. A. 2d, 1907); In re Hudson
River Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Lack of possession of the
pledged property has also generally been held fatal to the jurisdiction of a court in re-
ceivership proceedings to issue an injunction. International Banking Co. v. Lynch, 269
Fed. 242 (C. C. A. 9th, 1920); Northern Pacific Ry. v. Waterhouse & Co., 279 Fed. 790
(W. D. Wash. 1922); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress, 61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A, 7th, 1932).
13. Injunctions have been issued in cases where the validity of the pledge was con-
tested to restrain the pledgee's power of sale, pending determination of his real right to
the pledge. In re Mitchell, 278 Fed. 707 (C. C. A. 2d., 1922); In re Purkett, Douglas
& Co., 50 F. (2d) 435 (S. D. Cal. 1931).
14. In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453 (E. D. Pa. 1931); Cherry v. Insull Utility Invest-
ments Inc., 58 F. (2d) 1022 (N. D. Ill. 1932), rev'd by Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentress,
61 F. (2d) 329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932). But see In re Hudson River Navigation Corp.,
57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932): "The pledgee, having taken possession of the
documents, supposes himself for just that reason to be the sole judge of his necessities,
and lends on that understanding. So long as he keeps within the terms of the agreement,
he need not concern himself with the pledgor's fate or that of his creditors who must
stand in his shoes." To the same effect see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Fentres, 61 F. (2d)
329 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932).
15. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Railway Steel Spring Co., 258 Fed. 346 (C. C. A.
8th, 1919) ; Hatch, supra note 9, at 1103-1109; cf. In re Progressive Wall Paper Corp., 224
Fed. 143 (N. D. N. Y. 1915); In re Battle Island Paper Co., 259 Fed. 921 (N. D. N. Y.
1919). But where the sale of the collateral was made before the pledgor's bankruptcy
the validity of the sale has been generally upheld. Wheelwright v. St. Louis, New Orleans
& Ocean Canal Transportation Co., 56 Fed. 164 (E. D. La. 1893); Gilbert v. Fosston Mfg.
Co., 174 Minn. 68, 216 N. W. 778 (1927).
16. The majority of cases in which this argument has been considered has followed
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that conclusion, that the pledgee by being allowed to sell the bonds after the pledgors
bankruptcy is, in effect, multiplying claims against the estate of the bankrupt, since
on sale the debtor's pledged securities may fall into the hands of a number of
creditors, and since any deficiency in the original indebtedness remains enforceable
by the pledgee.17
Most of the courts which have granted injunctions against a sale of the pledge
have relied for authority on the admitted power of a bankruptcy court to restrain
a mortgagee from foreclosing a mortgage, not containing a power of sale, without
the court's consent after the bankruptcy of the mortgagor.18 Vigorous criticism
of this failure to distinguish between the effect of a mortgage and a pledge trans-
action has been made by some authorities.'9 It may, of course, be plausibly urged
that a distinction between a mortgage and a pledge is one primarily of terminology,
and that no good purpose is served by attempting to analyze too closely the nature
an early Supreme Court case, Jerome v. McCarter, 94 U. S. 734 (1876), refusing to
recognize any power to grant an injunction against the exercise of the power of sale
by a pledgee, even though the bonds pledged are the debtor's own. In re Ironclad Mfg.
Co, 192 Fed. 318 (C. C. A. 2d, 1912); Rogers Brown & Co. v. Tindel Morris Co, 271
Fed. 475, 476 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
17. See note 6, supra. The pledgee cannot prove as claims against the bankrupt's
estate both the principal obligation and the collateral promise to pay. Hitner v. Diamond
State Steel Co., 176 Fed. 384 (D. Del. 1910). The Missouri courts will not allow the
pledgee to exercise his power of sale even before the bankruptcy of a pledgor, in proce s
of reorganization. Dibert v. D'Arcy, 248 Mo. 617, 154 S. W. 1116 (1913). This position
is at least consistent; for the objection that if the pledgee sells the pledge the p.edgor is
subjected to multiplied claims exists as well before the pledgors bankruptcy as afterwards.
The pledgee in any case, like other secured creditors, is limited to proving against the bank-
rupt's estate the deficiency, if any, on the principal claim not satisfied by the sale or valua-
tion of the collateral. This is the so-called 'bankruptcy rule". See dissenting opinion of
White, J., in Merrill v. National Bank, 173 U. S. 131, 147 (1899); Note (1907) 21 HR~v.
L. Irv. 280; Note (1907) 23 HARv. L. REv. 219; Note (1923) 8 Un.. L. RE. 232.
18. The power of a bankruptcy court, after the bankruptcy of the mortgagor, to restrain
the institution of foreclosure proceedings in a court of conflicting jurisdiction is well recog-
nized. In re Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931); In re Jersey Island
Packing Co., 138 Fed. 625 (C. C. A. 9th, 1905). But in cases where a mortgage has bean
given with a power of sale to be exercised without resort to foreclosure proceedings, there
is a split of authority as to the right to enjoin the mortgagee from exercising such power
after the bankruptcy of the mortgagor. That he cannot be restrained: In re Smith, 3 F. (2d)
40 (S. D. Tex. 1924) ; Robinson v. Kay, 7 F. (2d) $76 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) ; see 3 Jo.:rs oz;
MOarGAGS, (8th ed. 1928) § 2330. Contra: In re Jersey Island Packing Co., 133 Fed. 625
(C. C. A. 9th, 1905); Allebach v. Thomas, 16 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927). In both
these latter cases the court held that the injunction merely interfered vith the mortgagee's
'remedy" not with his "right?'
19. See McGinnis, The Sale of Collateral Security by the Pledgee Thereof After t~e Ir-
tervention of the Bankruptcy of the Pledgor (1934) 9 IND. L. J. 195. The author argues that
cases involving injunctions against the foreclosure of mortgages are inapplicable, because
foreclosure of a mortgage usually requires judicial proceedings in a court of conflicting juris-
diction, and because a mortgagor usually retains possession of the mortgaged premis-'s so
that by succession the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over such property. See Roges
Brown & Co. v. Tindel Morris Co., 271 Fed. 475, 476 (E. D. Pa. 1921); in re Hudson River
Navigation Corp., 57 F. (2d) 175, 176 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
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of the division of property interests involved.s o But for the purpose of deciding
the question with which the instant case is concerned, the point of importance is
whether there exists a difference in commercial function performed by the pledge
and mortgage transactions. Both afford security to the lender, but from the lender's
point of view it may be argued that the right of a pledgee to exercise his power of
sale at his own discretion, at any time after the default of the debtor, is the sine
qua non of the pledge agreement; 21 a mortgage, on the other hand, may be deemed
a device designed less as a means of keeping assets potentially liquid than as merely
an ultimate security.
The instant case adopts implicitly the reasoning of the minority view, though os-
tensibly basing its decision on authority granted by Section 77. It is doubtful if
the specific provisions of Section 77 confer anything substantial by way of additional
jurisdiction which of itself would authorize a bankruptcy court to restrain pledgecs
from exercising a power of sale. The Act provides that: "The jurisdiction and
powers of the court . . . and the rights and liabilities of creditors . . . with respect
to the debtor and his property shall be the same as if a voluntary petition for ad.
judication had been filed and a decree of adjudication had been entered."22  This
provision seems rather clearly to incorporate into Section 77 the limitations, pre-
viously existing under the bankruptcy procedure on the power of the court with
respect to jurisdiction over the debtor's property.23 In other words, it would seem
that actual or constructive possession of property would be requisite to the exercise
of jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court as well under Section 77 as before the amend-
ment. Section 74 of the recent amendments, which enacts the same general policy
20. There is much confusion as to the nature of the property interest which passes to a
mortgagee, and the same seems true as to the interest which passes to a pledgee. As said In
In re Henry, 50 F. (2d) 453, 455 (E. D. Pa. 1931) an attempted analysis is "provocative of
a discussion which has no end." In either a mortgage or pledge transaction there is an obvious
division of property interests. The protection of the interest of one party may, perhaps,
justify a court in imposing some restrictions on the disposition of another party's interest,
at least when third party creditors are concerned. With this idea in mind, some writers
have inferred from Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber Co., 282 U. S. 734 (1931) that the
Supreme Court intended that all lienors of whatever nature should be required to secure
permission of the bankruptcy court before proceeding to enforce their liens, whether such
liens required judicial aid for their enforcement or not. See McGinnis, supra note 19, at
195, 207; Comment (1932) 41 YALF L. J. 445.
21. See footnote 8, supra. See also In re Chaiken, unreported decision of Federal Dis-
trict Court of Pennsylvania printed in full in (1933) 10 A. B. REv. 14. In this connection It
may be pointed out that in restraining the pledgee from selling the pledge, the court is only
delaying the time when the sale must take place, and it may be questionable whether the
court is any better judge of the most auspicious time for sale than the pledgee. See Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Galveston City Ry. Co., 87 Fed. 813, 815 (C. C. A. 5th, 1898); McGinnis, supra
note 19, at 220.
22. 47 STAT. 1481, § 77(n) (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 205(n) (1934).
23. See Bankruptcy Act § 57(h), 30 STAT. 560 (1898), 11 U. S. C. A. § 93(h) (1927),
which provides for the liquidation of a pledgee's securities according to the agreement of
the parties or in the absence of such agreement, by certain specified methods as the court
may direct. It has been held that this section evidenced an intention that the court may
direct what shall be done "only when the securities have not been disposed of by the creditor
in accordance with his contract." Hiscock v. Varick Bank, 206 U. S. 28, 40 (1907). The
same result was reached in In re Browne, 104 Fed. 762 (E. D. Pa. 1900); In re Mertens, 144
Fed. 818 (C. C. A. 2d, 1906).
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as represented in Section 77, specifically limits the jurisdiction of the court to extend
the time of payment of debts to those "the security for which is in actual or con-
structive posession of the debtor or of the custodian or receiver." -4 According to
two recent decisions under that section, this provision negatives any claim of juns-
diction of the bankruptcy court to issue injunctions against the sale of pledged col-
lateral. 25 The provision of Section 77 authorizing the court of bankruptcy to stay
"pending suits" or "judicial proceedings to enforce any lien"- 6 would likewise seem
to exclude by clear omission the power of a court to stay a pledgees power of sale,
since the exercise of such a power under a pledge agreement has been held to involve
no judicial proceedings. 27 And furthermore, as indicating absence of Congressional
intent to include within court supervision and control collateral of the debtor which
has been pledged, it should be pointed out that Congress must have had in mind
the interests of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, which is the pledgee of
collateral of most of the railroads in the country.28
It is suggested, therefore, that the question here presented to the Supreme Court
for final determination rests less on the scope of Section 77, as conferring new and
extended jurisdiction upon a bankruptcy court, than upon the validity of the argu-
ments as to the power of a court to enjoin a pledgee from exercising his power of sale
apart from Section 77. Thus there are two avenues open to the Court. It may
reaffirm its own decisions of long standing and those of a majority of the lower
federal courts to the effect that a pledgee may not be restrained from exercising his
power of sale after bankruptcy of the pledgor, on the ground that the bankruptcy
court has no possession of the pledged property.12  Or it may extend the scope of
its holding in the recent case of Isaacs v. Hobbs Tic and Timbcr Co.P to require a
pledgee, like a mortgagee, to secure permission of the bankruptcy court before exer-
cising a power of sale, with a view to facilitating reorganization proceedings. Such
a decision would appear to negative any assertion of distinction for this purpoZe
between a mortgage and pledge transaction, and would thus follow the reasoning
of the instant case and of the minority federal holdings to the effect that possession
of the debtor's equity in the pledged property is a sufficient basis for jurisdiction
to allow the court to control the manner of disposition of the property by the
pledgee.30 It seems probable that the determination of the validity of these con-
24. 47 STAT. 469, § 74(h) (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. § 202(h) (1934).
25. In re Doelger, unreported decision of Federal District Court of Nev York in (1933)
9 A. B. REv. 329; In re Chaiken, sup'a note 21, in (1933) 10 A. B. 1 v. 14.
26. 47 STAT. 1481, § 77(1) (1933), 11 U. S. C. A. 205(1) (1934).
27. See In re Doelger, supra note 25, in which the court, in interpreting a similar pro-
vision of Section 74 of the Bankruptcy Act in connection with a prtition for an injunction
against the sale of pledged collateral, stated: "Under these express provisions it seems clear
that the court's power to enjoin is restricted to court proceedings; and that an extension
may be obtained only of secured debts the security for which is in the actual or constructive
possession of the debtor, a custodian or receiver. Neither of these conditions is applicable
to the creditor here involved." See also, Joxrs, op. cit. supra note 11, § 2.
28. The railroads of the country owe the R. F. C. approximately $300,000,01D. 76 Co:G.
Rxc. 2659, 5271 (1933). These loans get no priority other than by reason of the pledged
collateral. The R. F. C. is not regarded as a governmental agency but as a private corpora-
tion, and hence is entitled to no preference as a creditor in bankruptcy. See 76 Co:;o. Pat.
2909, 5270 et seq. (1933).
29. 282 U. S. 734 (1931), noted in (1931) 31 CoL. L. REv. 1036; (1931) 65 U. S. L. liy.
361; (1932) 41 YAix L. J. 445.
30. See notes 14 and 15, supra.
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flicting arguments will be colored by weighing the obvious importance of facilitating
the rehabilitation of railroads, as well as other corporations,
3 1 as opposed to pre-
serving the integrity of the pledge transaction.
CERTAINTY IN CONTRACT TERMS
A RECENTLY decided English case1 departs from the customary rigid adherence
to the principle that a court will not make a contract for the parties, if the essential
terms are incomplete, doubtful, or ambiguous. In part consideration for the con-
veyance of land by the plaintiff, owner of a petrol filling station, the defendants
agreed to purchase from the plaintiff all petrol required by the defendants for the
operation of their business as motor coach proprietors, at a price to be agreed by
the parties in writing and from time to time. The agreement contained an arbitra-
tion clause for the settlement of any dispute which should arise on the subject-
matter or construction of the agreement.2 For three years the defendants purchased
petrol from the plaintiff, at prices set by the latter, without any agreement in
writing as to the price. Then on a refusal by the defendants to purchase any more
petrol, the plaintiff brought action for a declaration that the agreement was binding
and to enjoin the defendants from purchasing petrol elsewhere. The court enforced
the contract, holding that in the absence of a written agreement a reasonable price
is to be implied, and that failing agreement as to what is a reasonable price, arbi-
tration is to take place.3
American courts have in general conceived of a contract as a precise and completed
agreement, each detail of which can be enforced by the court without departing
from or adding to the terms of the agreement. 4 Qualification of this conception
31. The provisions of Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act apply to corporations in gen-
eral substantially the same reorganization privileges as are provided by Section 77 for rail-
roads. See note 9, supra. It seems probable, therefore, that a decision on the question under
consideration would be equally applicable under Section 77B.
1. Foley v. Classique Coaches Limited, 151 L. T. R. 242 (Ct. App. 1934).
2. It would seem that the price of the petrol is an element of the "subject-matter"
of the contract, and so would come within the operation of the arbitration clause. The
court so held in the principal case. But cf. Steinmeyer v. Schroeppel, 226 Ill. 9, 80 .. E,
564 (1907) (held that the price was not a part of the subject-matter of a contract).
3. The mode of enforcement of the contract employed by the court consisted of a
declaration that the petrol agreement was valid and binding upon the parties, an injunction
to restrain the defendants from purchasing petrol elsewhere, an account of all petrol
bought by the defendants in breach of the agreement, and damages for breach of contract.
4. Clark v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 81 Fed. 282 (C. C. D. Wash. 1897); George W.
Wilcox, Inc. v. Shell Eastern Petroleum Products, Inc., 283 Mass. 383, 186 N. E. 562
(1933); McKibbin v. Brown, 14 N. J. Eq. 13 (Ch. 1861). It has often been stated
that a greater degree of certainty is required for the specific enforcement of a contract
than for damages in an action at law. Ward v. Ward, 94 Colo. 275, 30 P. (2d) 853
(1934); Olympia Bottling Works v. Olympia Brewing Co., 56 Ore. 87, 107 Pac. 969
(1910); McDaniel v. Daves, 139 Va. 178, 123 S. E. 663 (1924). That there seems to
be no sound basis for this distinction see Foot v. Webb, 59 Barb. 38, 54 (N. Y. 1866);
Humble, Certainty in Contracts (1932) 20 Ky. L. J. 121. See also RESTATEMNT, CON-
TRACTS (1932) §§ 32, 370. For an exposition of the background of the rule requiring
certainty in actions for specific performance in equity, see Pound, The Progress of the
Law-Equdty (1920) 33 HAuv. L. REv. 420, 434.
[Vol. 44
has been permitted only where there has been entire or partial performance by the
offeree upon an offer which was itself too indefinite to create a contract if verbally
accepted; 5 where the indefinite provision in an agreement is a matter of form and
not of substance; 6 and where a basis is set forth in the agreement for establishing
the essential terms.7 In many instances, however, the courts have shown a greater
willingness to attach a sufficiently definite meaning to a bargain where non-enforce-
ment of the agreement will leave one of the parties in an inequitable position. Thus,
where a lessee made improvements on the faith of a lease-option contract providing
for the payment of a stipulated sum on terms to be agreed upon, the court sped-
fically enforced the contract; s whereas, ordinarily, a provision in a contract for
the sale of land which leaves open the terms of payment for future negotiation
renders the contract incomplete and unenforceable in equity.0  Similarly, contracts
for life employment in consideration of release from claims for personal-injury
damages have been enforced,' 0 while a mere contract for permanent employment
is terminable at the will of either party." The instant case may be said to fall
within that class of cases where the parties cannot effectively be placed in statu
quo by restitution, 12 since the obligation to buy gasoline was part consideration for
the executed transfer of the property; the decree of specific performance would
effect a more just result. Upon that ground alone can the instant case be
distinguished from decisions in the American courts which have held that a contract
5. REsTATEmENT, Co-,nmcLrs (1932) § 33; Varney v. Ditmars, 217 N. Y. 223, i1l
N. E. 822 (1916). Performance of the indefinite promise does not make the promis2
enforceable, but gives rise to a quasi-contractual obligation to pay the fair value of what
has been given. 1 WhLSTox, ConmAcrs (1920) § 49.
6. Swedish-American National Bank v. Merz, 179 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1919) (manner
and form of payment); Dugger v. Kelly, 16S Iowa 129, 150 N. W. 27 (1914) (contract
silent as to measure of damages for breach).
7. United States v. Porter, 9 F. (2d) 153 (E. D. Mich. 1925); Lungerbausen v.
Crittenden, 103 Mich. 173, 61 N. W. 270 (1S94) (promise to pay plaintiff as much as
defendant paid other attorneys in the case); Pallange v. Mueller, 205 Wis. lg, 238
N. W. 815 (1931).
8. Morris v. Ballard, 16 F. (2d) 175 (App. D. C. 1926).
9. Huff v. Shepard, 58 Mo. 242 (1874); Monahan v. Allen, 47 Mont. 75, 130 Pac.
768 (1913); Bean v. Holmes, 236 S. W. 120 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
10. Fisher v. Roper Lumber Co., 183 N. C. 485, Ill S. E. 857 (1922); Royster Guano
Co. v. Hll, 68 F. (2d) 533 (C. C. A. 4th 1934).
11. Rape v. Mobile and Ohio Rr. Co., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924). The rule
is here stated- that a contract for permanent employment which is not supported by
an independent consideration, other than the obligation of service to be performed, is
terminable at the pleasure of either party.
12. In contracts providing for the determination of terms by arbitration, courts have
generally held that where the parties have incurred obligations under the contract so that
they cannot be placed in statu quo by restitution, the court iUll substitute itself for the
arbitrators. Castle Creek Water Co. v. City of Aspen, 146 Fed. 8 (C. C. A. 8th 1905);
Dooley v. Resnik, 256 Mass. 205, 152 N. E. 231 (1926); Bristol v. Bristol and Warren
Water Works, 19 R. I. 413, 34 AtI. 359 (1896); see Hayest Specific Performance of Con-
tracts for Arbitration or Valuation (1916) 1 CosRy. L. Q. 225, 231. An attempt is made
to differentiate between a contract calling for its terms to be fixed by arbitrators and
one whose terms are to be agreed upon by the parties in Comment (1923) 36 H~nv.
L. REV. 726, 730.
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for the continuous delivery of goods at a price to be agreed upon by the parties
is unenforceable for lack of certainty.13
This rationalization of the principal case may reconcile many of the cases, but it
must ultimately rest on the broader ground of the justice of the complainant's
cause. The soundness of the results obtaining in partially executed contracts, as
in the principal case, is unquestioned. But if the liberality of interpretation ac-
corded such contracts is founded upon the dictates of justice, such dictates might
well be extended to the enforcement of executory contracts with the same liberality.
From the standpoint of fairness and consistency, both kinds of contracts should
be similarly construed, regardless of the relative position of the parties at the time
the action is brought. The standards for such an interpretation do not necessarily
undermine well-recognized principles of the law of contract, even if the effect may
be to liberalize the formal concept of a contract. If the court is satisfied that the
parties intended to enter into a binding agreement,14 as in the instant case, and if
there is an objective standard capable of determination and application by experts,
15
then the court might well give effect to the contract. To do so would perhaps be
to fill in gaps, but, rather than making an altogether new contract for the parties,
would compel the doing of that which was probably contemplated. Thus, in Kann
v. Wausau Abrasives Co.10 the court enforced a five-year option contract, supple-
mental to a contract for the purchase and sale of garnet, which called for the sale
to the plaintiff at his option of the output of defendant's garnet mine in excess of
the defendant's own requirements in the paper and cloth trade, the price to be fixed
annually during the five-year period. It was held that the standard for the quantity
was the capacity of the mine as reasonably operated, and that the price could be
ascertained by the increased cost of production due to advances in labor, material
and supplies, the basal figure of $45 per ton having been fixed in the original con-
tract to supply 1000 tons of garnet to the plaintiff.
Such a liberal interpretation of contract terms is needed to prevent undue judicial
interference with the practices of business men.11 The bargains of business men
are often hurriedly framed and recorded by them in summary fashion, appearing
incomplete and uncertain only to those unfamiliar with the business. These bar-
gains should not be destroyed by the courts because of some degree of uncertainty.
Of particular interest in this respect are those cases in which business men have
made large forward contracts for goods, since in such contracts it is rarely possible
to specify in advance all the details of the performance. In such business trans.
actions, fairness and justice might well be with the complainant's cause despite the
tact that the contract might be wholly executory at the time of trial. This attitude
is reflected in the judicial tendency to construe "requirement" contracts more liber-
ally and to draw into issue the "honest" requirements and "good faith" of the buyer,
13. Watts v. Weston, 62 Fed. 136 (C. C. A. 2nd 1894) (only nominal damages allowed
in breach of contract to buy entire output of colliery for twenty years at a price to be
agreed on from month to month); United Press v. New York Press Co., 164 N. Y. 406,
58 N. E. 527 (1900) (only nominal damages recovered in breach of contract to deliver
news report for publication at a sum not exceeding $300 per week); Sun Printing and
Publishing Ass'n v. Remington Paper and Power Co., 235 N. Y. 338, 139 N. E. 470 (1923).
14. Cases where the parties dearly believe they have concluded a bargain are to be
differentiated from those in which there are indications of no intention to enter into binding
relations; that is, "subject to contract" cases.
15. See Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 567, 40 N. E. 1044, 1045 (1895).
16. 81 N. H. 535, 129 Atl. 374 (1925).
17. See Note (1933) 49 L. Q. REv. 316.
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rather than limit the interpretation to those items incident to the established busi-
ness of the buyer.18
ASSUMPTION O JOINT MOIRTGAGE AS AvomANcE OF FEDERAL ESTATE TAX On
TENANCY BY ENTIRETY
THE survival of the old common law concept of tenancies by entirety as consisting
in one legal personage, both husband and wife being seised of the whole estate,' has
created considerable difficulty in attempts by governmental authorities to tax the
accretion of powers and rights in such property to one spouse upon the death of the
other. Formerly it had been held that, since both husband and wife were owners by
entirety upon the creation of the tenancy,2 there could be no transfer of ownership
through the death of one tenant, but only a cessation of the deceased's share in the
relationship,3 on which no tax could be levied 4 It is apparent, however, that the
survivor, by reason of the death, gains full control and sole power of disposal, and
hence a definite enlargement of rights. The federal estate tax statute now purports
to cover this situation by providing that all property in the decedent's gross estate,
held as tenant by the entirety, is subject to tax, "except such part thereof as may be
shown to have originally belonged to" the surviving tenant, and never to have been re-
ceived or acquired by the latter from the decedent for less than an adequate and full
consideration in "money or money's worth."5 Further provision is made that where
any property has been acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance as a tenancy by
entirety, it is taxable upon the death of one tenant against his estate to the extent of
one-half of the value of the tenancy. Under the statute, therefore, where the proparty
is purchased by husband or wife or both, and title taken by them as tenants by
entirety, the amount paid by the survivor through outlay of funds or through giving
of adequate consideration of any other kind is exempted from the gross estate of the
18. See Havighurst and Berman, Requirement and Output Contracts (1932) 27 In..
L. Rxv. 1, and cases cited therein.
1. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464, 469 (1888); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273
M.o. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); 1 TFAnY, REAL PaoPar (2d ed. 1920) 645; cf. KDDUZ,
STATE L=IAxCE TAx AND TAxarIrr OF Thusts (1934) 119 (distinction between joint
tenancies and tenancies by entirety).
2. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464 (1888) ; Palmer v. Mlansfield, 222 ass. 263, 110 N.
E. 283 (1915); Hardenbergh v. Hardenbergh, 10 N. J. Law 49 (1828); Bertles v. Nunan, 92
N. Y. 152 (183); Belhl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 A. 953 (1912); Beddingfield v. EMtill
& Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S. W. 103 (1907); Note (1930) 16 Com. L. Q. 114.
3. Loughran v. Lemmon, 19 App. Cas. 141 (D. C. 1901); Mlaitten v. Barley, 174 Ind.
620, 92 N. E. 738 (1910); Webber v. Webber, 217 Mlich. 178, 185 N. W. 761 (1921); Stifel's
Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mlo. 159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); In re Kiatzls Estate, 216
N. Y. 83, 110 N. E. 181 (1915); Gray v. Bailey, 117 N. C. 439, 23 S. E. 318 (1895); BeihI
v. Martin, 236 Pa. 519, 84 At. 953 (1912); Whitley v. Aleador, 137 Tenn. 163, 192 S. W.
718 (1916).
4. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Phillips, 30 F. (2d) 39S (A. D. Pa. 1929); United
States v. Provident Trust Co., 35 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929); Appeal of Suse M. Root,
5 B. T. A. 696 (1926); Appeal of George R. Dyer, 5 B. T. A. 711 (1926); -ee In re Welden's
Estate, 146 Mlisc. 381, 386-391, 262 N. Y. Supp. 437, 443-447 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Knowlton
v. Moore 178 U. S. 41 (1900) (discussion of historical development of transfer taxes).
5. 44 STAT. 70 (1926), 26 U. S. C. A. § 1094(e) (1928). This section also applies to joint
tenancies. Cf. Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S. 224 (1932).
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decedent, and the rest is taxed. Thus if the husband paid the entire consideration
himself, or provided funds for payment by the wife, the whole property is taxable on
the wife's survivorship. 6 In such a case, the interest in joint ownership which the
wife had been enjoying as a tenant by entirety is accordingly disregarded in comput-
ing the value of the additional interest and control to which she succeeds. But if the
wife had paid for the whole property, and the husband died first, no part of the in-
terest passing to the wife would be taxable, although her rights would here also
receive that enlargement on which the government based its power to tax.7 These
decisions illustrate the logical discrepancies inevitable in certain situations between
the actual theory of the tax and the consequences of its application.8
In a recent federal case another such situation arose which may provide a further
means for tax evasion, if the doctrine of the court therein set forth is followed.0 A
husband and wife, in the course of acquiring certain realty to be held by them as
tenants by entirety, procured various parcels of land by making part payment in cash,
and jointly giving and assuming mortgages as the balance of the consideration. Sub.
sequently certain payments were made on the mortgages. The husband died, and the
wife, as his executrix, paid under protest a tax on the transfer of the entire net estate,
computed after deducting the unpaid amount of the mortgages, as permitted by treas-
ury regulations.10 Later she sought a refund, on the grounds that she had individu-
ally supplied half of the original cash payment; that her signature of the mortgages
was, as to one-half of their amount, the equivalent of a contribution to the purchase
price, as of property which "originally belonged" to her within the meaning of the
statute; and that consequently her husband's estate was entitled to a deduction of
one-half of the tax payments made. The court found the evidence insufficient to
support her contention as to her contribution of half of the original cash payment,11
but held that her assumption of liability on the mortgages was consideration "orig-
inally" supplied by her, and consequently granted a refund as to the tax assessed on
6. Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (1930), noted in (1930) 16 CoRNu. L. Q. 114 and
(1930) 79 U. or PA. L. REv. 233; Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 287 U. S,
224 (1932), noted in (1933) 21 CAi.'. L. REV. 286; Third National Bank & Trust Company
of Springfield v. White, 287 U. S. 585 (1932), noted in (1933) 46 HARv. L. REv. 718;
O'Shaughnessy v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 60 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 6th, 1932);
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Emery, 62 F. (2d) 591 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); In re
Weiden's Estate, 263 N. Y. 107, 188 N. E. 270 (1933); see Comments (1934) 34 CoL, L,
Rxv. 526 and (1933) 1 GEo. WAsH. L. RaV. 258.
7. "If the event is death and the result which is made the occasion of the tax Is the
bringing into being or the enlargement of property rights, and Congress chooses to treat the
tax imposed upon that result as a death duty, even though, strictly, in the absence of an
expression of the legislative will, it might not thus be denominated, there is nothing in the
Constitution which stands in the way." Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 302 (1930);
Robinson v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 63 F. (2d) 652 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933).
8. Cf. PnxE.TON AND MIL.SAPs, IN==ANCE AND EsTATE TAXEs (1926) 136-160
(diversity of methods of measurement in state taxation upon tenancies by entirety),
9. Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N. D. N. Y. 1933).
10. The full amount of unpaid mortgages may be deducted from the gross estate under
U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 38.
11. The original cash payment, given in addition to the mortgages, had been made
with money borrowed on promissory notes, on which the wife was an accommodation
indorser, and from moneys held in joint bank accounts by the husband and wife. The
court found the evidence insufficient to indicate that any of this money had actually been
supplied by the wife. Bremer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148, 152, 153, 155 (N. D. N. Y. 1933),
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one-half of the amount paid up on the mortgages. This result was reached despite
the fact that the wife had owned substantially no separate assets of her own at the
time of the original purchase of the property, which is the time at which the estate
tax statute and the departmental regulations issued thereunder appear to require a
determination of the amount of consideration provided by the surviving tenant. The
court further observed that the recognition of such an exemption might well permit
a husband to evade the estate tax by taking title to real estate with his wife as tenants
by entirety, giving a joint mortgage for the whole consideration, and the husband
paying it off out of his own assets.
At common law the whole of a tenancy by entirety was liable for the husband's
debts, and a purchaser at a sale on execution took the entire property, although sub-
ject to the wife's right of survivorship.' 2 Under the married women's property
acts,' 3 however, although a few jurisdictions hold to the earlier common law
theory,14 the majority regards the entire property as immune during coverture from
a judgment against either spouse; 15 and under a third view, if the husband alone gives
a mortgage on the estate by entirety, the mortgagee on foreclosure will become a
tenant in common with the wife as to half of the property, subject nevertheless to
her right of survivorship to the whole property should she outlive her husband.10 It
is apparent therefore that the execution of a mortgage in which the wife joins is of
distinct advantage to the mortgagee, since on foreclosure he would gain title to the
whole property free of any claim of survivorship. From the mortgagee's point of
view, therefore, the wife obviously provides consideration. Whether the wife's
assumption of liability on the mortgage in this situation, however, is sufficient con-
sideration, so that a portion of the purchased property equivalent to one-half of the
face value of the mortgage may be said to have "originally belonged" to her within
the meaning of the statute, is open to question. The statute* and the departmental
regulations17 reveal the definite requirement that there shall be deducted from the
12. Washburn v. Bums, 34 N. J. Law 18 (1869); Hall v. Stephens, 6S Mlo. 670 (1877);
Bennett v. Child, 19 Wis. 383 (1865); Wnu.rs, RFn.r Paorrar (24th ed. 1926) 372; cf.
Naylor v. linock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N. W. 664 (1893); 2 BL. Co=n.. *434.
13. Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 152 (1883); Armondi v. Dunham, 128 Misc. 881, 220
N. Y. Supp. 487 (Sup. Ct. 1927); Comment (1924) 37 HARnv. L. Rxv. 616; Note (1934)
34 CoL. L. Rnv. 762; see 1 TzrrA.rY, op. cit. supra note 1, at 650.
14. Pray v. Stebbins, 141 Mlass. 219, 4 N. E. 824 (1886); Bernatavicius v. Bernatavi ius,
259 Mass. 486, 156 N. E. 685 (1927) ; Speier v. Opfer, 73 Mch. 35, 40 N. W. 909 (ISaS);
Morrill v. Morrill, 138 Mlich. 112, 101 N. W. 209 (1904).
15. Hurd v. Hughes, 12 Del. 188, 109 At. 418 (Ch. 1920); Ohio Butterine Co. v.
Hargrave, 79 Fla. 458, 84 So. 376 (1920); Stifel's Union Brewing Co. v. Saxy, 273 Mo.
159, 201 S. W. 67 (1918); 2 BISHop, LAw or M nnz Woukzz (1875) § 284.
16. Hiles v. Fisher, 144 N. Y. 306, 39 N. E. 337 (1895); Mlardt v. Scharmach, 65 Mrc.
124, 119 N. Y. Supp. 449 (Sup. Ct., 1909); Comment (1924) 37 HAM. L. R V. 616; cf.
Bartkowaik v. Sampson, 73 Misc. 446, 133 N. Y. Supp. 401 (Sup. Ct. 191); N. Y. Domr
REL. LAw (1909) § 56. In New York a divorce would change the tenancy by entirety
to a tenancy in common. Stelz v. Schreck, 128 N. Y. 263, 28 N. E. 510 (1891); Note
(1930) 15 CoRN. L. Q. 655.
17. U. S. Treas. Reg. 70, Art. 23: "The entire value of such property is prima facie a
part of the decedent's gross estate ... " but there should not be "included a greater part
or proportion thereof than is represented by an outlay of funds, which, in the first in-
stance, were decedent's own . . .So much of the property . . . as originally belonged
to the other joint owner, and which at no time in the past has been received or acquired
by the latter from the decedent for less than an adequate consideration in money or
money's worth, forms no part of the decedent's gross estate."
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value of the tenancy in the decedent's estate only such part as may be shown to have
originally belonged to the surviving tenant, and never acquired by him from the
deceased tenant for less than an adequate consideration in money's worth. This lan-
guage should permit an evaluation of the actual amount given up or risked by the
survivor. If in fact the wife made no payments on the joint mortgage herself, she
actually has parted with no value not obtained gratis from her husband. And, unless
she has contributed to the original down payment, her signature on the mortgage is
merely a formality; for if the property should be foreclosed, she would lose only that
interest which she had gratuitously received from her husband, although, as in the
instant case, she would ordinarily be liable for a possible deficiency judgment.18 Only
to the extent that this personal liability is a genuine detriment to her, therefore,
should her signature of the mortgage be given any weight in the computation of the
tax exemption.
Conceivably the wife might have more than enough assets to meet any liability on
all or part of the mortgage. If so, her signing of the mortgage would be valuable con-
sideration, at least to the extent of her actual worth at that time, no matter how diffi-
cult of ascertainment it might be; for to this extent the risk of being compelled to
pay a deficiency judgment was a genuine detriment to her. To ignore the existence of
this actual consideration would be unjustifiable since the portion contributed by the
survivor is to be measured as of the time when the tenancy was created. It would
seem, therefore, that opportunity should be given to the wife to prove her ability to
satisfy any personal liability on the mortgage. Similar treatment is accorded the wife
in applying the federal estate tax to joint bank accounts, the whole amount being con-
sidered as the property of the deceased husband, passing by transfer on his death
unless the wife can show by proof, aside from any presumption, that she contributed
one-half or some part thereof.' 9 The ultimate test should therefore be, not whether
the mere assumption of the mortgage is consideration, but whether the wife could
show that she had available originally actual and substantial funds or business in-
terests with which to meet any obligations resulting from her signature.
NONDISCLOSURE AND THE POWER OF A BANX TO APPLY DEPOSITS AGAINST
UNMATURED OBLIGATIONS
T power of a bank to apply deposits against matured obligations and debts
owed to it, where the obligations of the depositor are in the same right or
capacity as the deposits,' is uniformly recognized. 2 But where the obligation to the
18. Goldman v. Rhoades, 122 Misc. 567, 203 N. Y. Supp. 548 (Sup. Ct. 1923); N. Y.
REAL PROP. LAW (1917) § 249. No present consideration is given the effect of the emergency
limitation on deficiency judgments, contained in N. Y. UxcoNsoL. LAWS (McKinnoy's
Supp. 1934) § 1083(a).
19. Reese v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 25 B. T. A. 38 (1931); Bremer v.
Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148, 155 (N. D. N. Y. 1933); cf. Waggoner Oil Association v. Hopkins, 269
U. S. 110 (1925). But cf. N. C. Cone ANx. (Michie, 1931) § 7880(1): "and in the absence
of evidence as to the proportion of the purchase price paid by the husband and wife, the
presumption will be that -each paid equal amounts, and only one-half of the value of the
property shall be charged to the survivor for inheritance tax."k
1. 2 MrczmE, BANxS AND BANKaNO (1913) §§ 134 (1 cba), 134 (1 ebb); I MousE,
BANxs AND BNmwo (1928) § 327; Newhouse v. First National Bank of Chicago, 13 F.
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bank is unmatured, the power to apply deposits in this manner has been categorically
denied 3 in the absence of a contract allowing such action.4 Under certain circum-
stances, however, the latter rule does not obtain. Insolvency of the depositor operates
to give the bank a power to rescind a credit advanced and to apply a set-off even
where the obligation to the bank is still unmatured.5 Fraud of the depositor in loan
transactions has the same result; an affirmative falsehood about a material fact
empowers the bank to assert a set-off.6 But even in the absence of an afnnnative
misrepresentation the basis for establishing such a power may be found in a failure
to disclose facts material to the contract. There are occasions upon which it becomes
the legal duty of one party to volunteer information unasked by the other, occasions
where failure to state a material fact is equivalent to a fraudulent concealment which
may avoid a contract like an affirmative falsehood This is true where facts material
to the transaction are peculiarly within the knowledge of one of the contracting
parties,8 where they are not dealing "at arm's length. '  A like situation is found
(2d) 887 (N. D. Ill. 1926) (bank not allowed to set off trust funds against parsonal
obligations of the depositing trustee).
2. American National Bank v. minor and Son, 142 Ky. 792, 135 S. W. 278 (1911);
State ex rel. Davis v. Farmers' and Merchants Bank of Morrill, 114 Neb. 373, 207 N. W.
666 (1926); Delano v. Equitable Trust Co., 110 Misc. 704, 181 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1920);
Shuman v. Citizens' State Bank, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 38S (1914) (a demand note
considered as due at the time of delivery thus becoming a matured obligation); 5 fcnmr,
BANgs mrw B&.-rG (1931) §§ 115b, 119b, 216.
3. Fifth National Bank of City of New York v. Lyttle, 250 Fed. 361 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918); First National Bank of Birmingham v. Minge, 136 Ala. 405, 64 So. 957 (1914);
Wiley v. Bunker Hill National Bank, 183 Mass. 495, 67 N. E. 655 (1903); Smith v.
Eighth Ward Bank of Brooklyn, 31 App. Div. 6, 52 N. Y. Supp. 290 (1st Dep't, 1893);
5 Mrcnr, B A.s AwD BAnnn=u (1931) § 126.
4. Wright v. Seaboard Steel and Manganese Corp., 272 Fed. 807 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921);
see Heidelbach v. National Park Bank, 87 Hun 117, 126, 33 N. Y. Supp. 794, 799 (Ist
Dep't, 1895); 5 MCHME, BAXXs AND BAnIo=G (1931) § 126.
S. Kane v. First National Bank of El Paso, 56 F. (2d) 534 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932);
United States v. Bank of Shelby, 68 F. (2d) 538 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Minge v. Fir-t
National Bank, 191 Ala. 271, 6S So. 141 (1915); Parker v. First National Bank of
Muldrow, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac. 39 (1923); Owens v. American National Bank of Au-tin,
36 Tex. Civ. App. 490, 81 S. W. 983 (1904). Confra: Merchants' National Bank of
Louisville v. Robinson, 97 Ky. 552, 31 S. W. 136 (1895).
6. Bradley v. Seaboard National Bank, 167 N. Y. 427, 60 N. E. 771 (1901); 7ann
v. Franklin Trust Co., 158 App. Div. 491, 143 N. Y. Supp. 660 (2d Dep't, 1913); Wolf
v. National City Bank, 170 App. Div. 565, 156 N. Y. Supp. 575 (1st Dep't, 1915). Searcb
has failed to reveal cases on this specific point in other jurisdfctions but as stated im
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61 (1878) at page 64, "There is no questoD
of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and
even judgments." And it may reasonably be believed that the same result would bL.
reached in other jurisdictions under similar circumstances.
7. Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 107 S. W. 287 (1903); see Copper Procass Co. v.
Chicago Bonding and Insurance Co., 262 Fed. 66, 73 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920); Rothdher
v. Stein, 143 N. Y. 581, 591, 38 N. E. 718, 720 (1894); 2 Pozxmoy, Eq. urrV Jumsw.-
DEN E (4th ed. 1918) § 901.
8. Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U. S. 383 (1888); Hays v. Meyerst,
139 Ky. 440, 107 S. W. 287 (1908); Bullock v. Crutcher, 180 S. W. 940 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915); 3 Wrmasrox, CONsTRAcrs (1920) § 1499.
9. Hays v. Meyers, 139 Ky. 440, 107 S. W. 287 (1903).
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where the parties are in a position of trust and confidence in which one party places
complete reliance upon the good faith of the other in making known to him such
facts as are customarily or obviously material to the contract or which will affect
the terms upon which he will be willing to contract.10 Illustrative of this position
of trust and confidence is the relationship found between applicant and insurer in
life and marine insurance law'1 and that between partners in a business.12 It seems
clear that the two situations, that in which there is a duty to disclose because
of an advantage in knowledge of facts and that in which the duty arises from a
position of trust and confidence, are closely analogous and often almost indistinguish-
able. Sometimes, therefore, no attempt is made to find a label and the duty to
disclose is derived from the facts of the particular case without classification. Thus
where a person solicits and receives credit on the basis of statements of financial
standing which are not truly indicative of his actual status, a finding of fraud has been
upheld.' 3 Also, where there is a decided change in the material facts between the date
when the representation is made and the date of the actual contracting, the party
aware of the change has been charged with a duty to acquaint the other with the
altered circumstances and a failure to do so has been considered fraudulent. 14 Even
where the concealment or misrepresentation of a material fact is innocent, the same
result has been reached.' 5
10. Pickering v. Day, 3 Houst. 474 (Del. 1867); Allen Realty Co. v. Uhler, 83 lnd.
App. 103, 146 N. E. 766 (1925); 1 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (1918) §§ 292, 296;
2 Po mROY, EQoury JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) §§ 901, 902; KrR, FRAUD AND
MISTAKE, (6th ed. 1929) 114; see Thomas v. Whitney, 83 Ill. App. 247, 255 (1898).
11. Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Inc. Co., 277 U. S. 311 (1927) (life insurance);
Equitable Life Assurance Society v. McElroy, 83 Fed. 631 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) (life
insurance); Merchants' and Shippers Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 219
App. Div. 636, 220 N. Y. Supp. 514 (1st Dept, 1927); PAR, INSURANCE, (3d ed. 1796) 174.
12. Rankin v. Kelly, 163 Ky. 463, 173 S. W. 1151 (1915); Grant v. Hardy, 33 WI.
668 (1873); see Joseph v. Mangos, 192 Iowa 729, 732, 185 N. W. 464, 465 (1921).
13. In re K. Marks and Co., 218 Fed. 453 (C. C. A. 2d, 1914); International Trust
Co. v. Myers, 241 Mass. 509, 135 N. E. 697 (1922); Mooney v. Davis, 75 Mich. 188,
42 N. W. 802 (1889).
14. Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U. S. 311 (1927); Loewer v. Harris,
57 Fed. 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1893); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F. (2d) 634 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1929). In the English case of Traill v. Baring, 4 De G. J. & S. 318 (1864) Lord
Justice Turner said (p. 328) ". . . if a person makes a representation by which he
induces another to take a particular course and the circumstances are afterwards altered
to the knowledge of the party making the representation, but not to the knowledge of
the party to whom the representation is made and are so altered that the alteration
...may affect the course of conduct which may be pursued by the party to whom
the representation is made, it is the imperative duty of the party who has made the
representation to communicate to the party to whom the representation has been made,
the alteration of those circumstances. ..
15. Taylor v. Burr Printing Co., 26 F. (2d) 331 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928); American
Educational Co. v. Mary Taggert, 124 Ill. App. 567 (1906); Montgomery Door and
Sash Co. v. Atlantic Lumber Co., 206 Mass. 144, 92 N. E. 71 (1910); 3 WI15sT N,
CoNTRAcrs (1920) § 1500. In the event of such an innocent misrepresentation, an action
at law for fraud and deceit would not be maintainable since scienter is a requisite of
such actions. Consequently, a remedy for innocent misrepresentation can be found only
in equity where scienter is not essential. Owing to the difficulty of proving fraudulent
knowledge and intent many cases are brought to equity for aid where the innocence of
An illustration of the conditions under which a duty to disclose may arise is found
in a recent federal case. The plaintiffs, cotton brokers on the New York Cotton
Exchange, on June 13, 1930 requested of the defendant bank a loan of $75,OOD,
representing that they were in only temporary financial straits due to a heavy
market decline and delay in remittances from accounts in their Havre branch. The
brokerage firm had been customers of the bank for more than ten years but now
for the first time applied for an unsecured loan. Their latest financial report, dated
March 31, which was called for by the bank, showed them to be in a sound financial
position. Actually, however, on June thirteenth, plaintiffs' financial position was
impaired by an account maintained with them by the manager of their Havre branch
under an assumed name for the purpose of speculation. On this date, the account
had an unsecured balance of $190,000 owing to plaintiffs, whereas exchange rules
forbade the extension of credit of more than $10,000 to any customer.10 Although
evidence revealed that plaintiffs had reason to believe something was wrong with
the account, nothing was said to the bank and the loan was given on the firm's five
day note due on June eighteenth. On June seventeenth, when the account had
been closed out by the plaintiffs and the defalcation of the Havre manager had
been discovered with a resulting loss of some $270,000, the bank learned the full
facts and at once elected to rescind. It therefore applied the plaintiffs' balance on
deposit against the $75,000 credit and refused to honor their subsequent checks.
Presumably as a result of this procedure, the brokerage firm was suspended from
the exchange on the following day, although it later proved to be solvent. In an
action for the refusal to honor the checks, it was held that the defendant had the
"right to rescind" (i. e., a privileged power to alter its legal status as debtor of the
plaintiffs for the sum deposited), since the statement given was an implied representa-
tion that plaintiffs' financial position was materially the Same on June thirteenth as on
March thirty-first and because plaintiffs failed to acquaint the bank with material
facts. 17
In order to ascertain whether a duty to disclose should be found in the present
case, it is necessary to determine whether the circumstances of the case reveal a
fiduciary relation or a position of superior knowledge. Since brokers start with a
comparatively small capitalization' 8 and deal in large sums in the futures market while
extending credit to customers, they must inevitably be to a large extent dependent
on their bankers for advances of credit. On the other hand, since the trading on
a commodity exchange is largely in futures,10 the exact position of a broher can
be fully cognizable only to himself and the bank must depend very heavily upon
his good faith in revealing facts about his position when granting loans to him.
When an unsecured loan is made, the reliance placed upon the good faith of the
borrower is even more evident. The relationship thus becomes one of the utmost
good faith similar to that in the insurance" and partnership' 2 cases. Even had
there been no previous dealings between the bank and the broker a relationship
of trust and confidence could be held to exist, for the duty of disclosure may arise
not only through a continuing and pre-existing fiduciary relationship but also from
the position of the parties in a particular transaction in which open dealina is
essential2° as was true of the unsecured loan in the present case. It might he
the representing party is not so dear, especially when the claim of fraud is rai-sed as a
defense.
16. New York Cotton Exchange, Charter, Bylaws, and Rules (1932) Rule 33.
17. Monier v. Guaranty Trust Co., (unexported, S. D. N. Y. Nov. 5, 1934).
18. CoNvESE, MiekREInG MEnODS AND PoucMS (1924) 161.
19. BAER AND Wooniuru2, CoaM rr EXCANGES (1929) 2.
20. Beach v. Wilton, 244 Ill. 413, 91 N. E. 492 (1910); 2 Po nmoy, Egunv J uns-
PRUDExcE (4th ed. 1918) § 902.
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argued that the failure of the plaintiffs to acquaint the bank with the doubtful state
of the Havre account was not a material concealment in view of the ultimate sol-
vency of the plaintiffs; but this contention seems unreasonable since the bank would
almost certainly have been unwilling to extend credit upon an unsecured note had
it known of the uncertain nature of the account. Further, since the statement in
the case was given only at the request of the bank and was patently not a statement
as of the date given, the claim might be advanced that there was no duty to dis-
close the change in position but rather an obligation on the bank to ask for further
information if desired. However, inasmuch as the status of a broker's accounts
may be rapidly and materially altered by fluctuations in the market, of which the
bank will be wholly unaware, it seems more reasonable to impose a duty upon the
broker to disclose the change in position. Moreover, if the stringent duty of dis-
closure in such relationships were to be relaxed, banks might be disinclined to lend
to brokers unless in every case ample collateral were furnished, with a consequent
hampering of operations in futures. Since loan and credit transactions depend upon
moral integrity as well as upon capital, and extensive development of credit is
possible only where abuse of confidence is guarded against, 21 this case seems to
be a proper one for the application of the equitable remedy by allowing the bank
to rescind the credit advanced and to set off the plaintiffs' deposit against the note,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY
PLAINTIFF, by the terms of a lease, was to pay taxes on the building leased by
him to the defendant. For several years a vault installed in the building by the
defendant lessee had been assessed to the plaintiff as part of the building, and
plaintiff had paid the tax on the premises, but a controversy eventually arose be-
tween the parties as to which one was obligated to pay the tax on the vault.
Plaintiff petitioned in a court of equity for a reformation of the lease. After the
trial, the court, though finding no grounds shown for reformation, allowed the
plaintiff to amend the petition by eliminating the prayer for reformation and sub-
stituting therefore a request for a declaratory judgment for recovery of the taxes
already paid by the plaintiff on the vault.'
Patently, the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law in a suit for breach of
contract.2 The bill, therefore, might have been amended and transferred to the
law side of the court,a or dismissed to bring proper suit.4 In either case there would
have been delay in instituting the proper procedure or suit. And with like effect
some courts have refused a declaratory judgment merely because the plaintiff had
21. MILLER, BANK LOANs ON STATEUENT AND CHARACTER (1927) 9 et seq.; GAvis,
PRINCIPLES OF MONEY AND CRErr (1933) 312.
1. Callahan v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 190 N. E. 792 (Mass. 1934).
2. Phinney v. Foster, 189 Mass. 182, 75 N. E. 103 (1905).
3. Koontz v. Bay Circuit Judge, 224 Mich. 463, 194 N. W. 1018 (1923).
4. San Giacomo v. Oraton Investment Co., 103 N. J. Eq. 273, 143 Atl, 329 (1928)
(suit for accounting, proof showing only right to recover interest which was awarded
by chancellor, reversed and dismissed on grounds suit should have been at law); Page
v. St. Lawrence Condensed AM Corp., 213 App. Div. 336, 210 N. Y. Supp. 261 (3rd
Dep't 1925) (complaint dismissed for demanding equitable relief but stating a legal cause
of action); Boissevain v. Boissevain, 224 App. Div. 576, 231 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1st Dep't,
1928). Such cases, however, are in the minority and appear only sporadically in code states.
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available another remedy.5 The instant case, however, recognizes the declaratory
judgment as an alternative remedy.0 This attitude, coupled with a liberal discre-
tionary power of amendment, 7 produced a complete settlement of the controversy on
its merits without procedural technicalities or delay. Furthermore, since the declara-
tory judgment is not classifiable as either a legal or equitable remedy s there can b
no necessity to require a transfer of the case to the other judicial branch; either
a court of equity or of law, once having acquired jurisdiction, can grant relief by de-
claratory judgment.9
The declaratory judgment as an alternative remedy is important primarily in a
procedural sense because of its simplicity and its availability in cases where delay
in settlement of a controversy can be avoided. It is true that most courts adhere
to the conception which dissociates the remedy sought from the cause of action 0
5. Miller v. Siden, 259 Mich. 19, 242 N. IV. 823 (1932); Lisbon Village District v.
Town of Lisbon, 85 N. H. 173, 155 At. 252 (1931); Loesch v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.,
128 Misc. 232, 218 N. Y. Supp. 412 (Sup. Ct. 1926); Green v. Inter-Ocean Casualty Co,
203 N. C. 767, 167 S. E. 38 (1932); In re List's Estate, 283 Pa. 255, 129 AU. 64 (1925);
In re Cryan's Estate, 301 Pa. 386, 152 At. 675 (1930); Miller v. Currie, 203 VAes. 199,
242 N. W. 570 (1932); see Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310, 312, 242 N. W. 174, 175
(1932). But see BORCuAiD, DECLARATORy JUDnGtZr'M;s (1934) at 151-153, to the effect
that Pennsylvania, though apparently committed to this view, has granted declaratory
judgments in many cases where another remedy was available. See also Borchard,
Declaratory Judgrwnts in Pennsylvania (1934) 82 U. oP PA. L. REv. 317.
6. MAss. GEx. LAWS (1932) c. 213, § 3 (10A), provides for power of the courts
.. to make binding determinations of right interpreting the same, whether any con-
sequential judgment or relief is or could be claimed or not. . " Si mlar wording is
used in the Umrroma DncxAroa- Junoarm-rs Acr, which has for the most part been
interpreted as expressing dearly the intention to have declaratory judgments rendered as
alternative remedies. See Tolle v. Struve, 124 Cal. App. 263, 12 P. (2d) 61 (1932);
Chick v. MacBain, 157 Va. 60, 160 S. E. 214 (1931).
7. Massachusetts courts have been consistently liberal in permitting amendments even
after trial to allow the plaintiff to recover for the "cause of action" he intended to bring
and thus to prevent a variance between pleading and proof. Attorney General v. Henry,
262 Mass. 127, 159 N. E. 539 (1923) (amendment allowed by appellate court changing
petition for mandamus to information in nature of quo warranto); Ames v. Beal, 224
Mass. 56, 187 N. E. 99 (1933) (recovery of rent allowed on basis of tenancy at will
when complaint sought to recover under a written lease). See also Pizer v. Hunt, 253
Mass. 321, 148 N. E. 801 (1925); Cutter v. Arlington Construction Co., 263 Mars. 83,
167 N. E. 266 (1929); Janevesian v. Esa, 274 M ,as. 231, 174 N. E. 279 (1931); Peladeau
v. Gillespie Lumber Co., 188 N. E. 380 (Mass. 1933).
8. See BoRcHaPD, supra note 5, at 138 and cases there cited.
9. There would be no possibility of such requirement of transfer in code states. But
in states where law and equity is still administered in separate courts it would be a
distinct limitation of the usefulness of the declaratory judgment to have it 'cifed as
either a legal or an equitable remedy. In New Jersey the declaratory judgment has in
some cases been deemed a legal remedy where the declaration sought involved legal
questions, and petitions in equity have thus been refused and the plaintiff required to
start his suit all over again. The unfortunate delays caused by such a conception of the
declaratory judgment are well illustrated by the New Jersey cases. See Paterson v.
Currier, 98 N. J. Eq. 48, 129 AUt. 711 (1925); Wight v. Board of Education, 99 N. J.
Eq. 843, 133'Atl. 387 (1926); BoRcuARD, supra note 5, at 139-144 (reviewing these cases).
10. This conception is especially predominant in code states. See CLAm, CoDr PLr..
nm (1928) at 184 and cases there cited. See also BoRcmum, supra note S, at 15-16.
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and hence will allow a substitution of remedy by amendment in the prayer for
relief where the other party will not be prejudiced thereby.11 But the declaratory
judgment offers exceptional possibilities for thus terminating litigation when the
issues in controversy have been fully tried. The court can more readily grant a
declaratory judgment in lieu of the remedy originally sought than any other type
of relief because no special elements of damage nor any other peculiar requirements
which may be necessary for coercive relief have to be proved.1 - And, as in the
principal case, where the controversy is one apparently involving a mere difference
of opinion as to the interpretation of obligations under a written instrument, the
declaratory judgment avoids the appearance of coercion and branding one party
as a contract breaker.13 It is to be expected that a court may hesitate to grant
coercive relief when the plaintiff has not asked for such relief,1 4 but the same con-
siderations of hesitancy should not move a court to withhold a declaration as to
the legal relations of the parties. 15 Indeed, a court can, on its own motion, grant
a declaratory judgment when it seems that all the plaintiff needs is an interpretation
of his rights.16 The instant case merely calls attention to the practical utility of
New York has wavered between adopting this view and clinging to the old idea that
the relief sought is the test of the validity of a cause of action and that failure to show
a right to such relief disqualifies the plaintiff. See Page v. St. Lawrence Condensed Milk
Corp., 213 App. Div. 336, 210 N. Y. Supp. 261 (3rd Dep't, 1925). Contra: Port v.
Holzinger, 212 App. Div. 124, 125, 208 N. Y. Supp. 287 (2nd Dep't, 1925). But even
in non-code states like Massachusetts the prayer for relief is generally held to be no
part of the cause of action. Ginzberg v. Wyman, 272 Mass. 499, 172 N. E. 614 (1930);
Mackintosh v. Chambers, 190 N. E. 38 (Mass. 1934).
11. Kerr. v. Whitney, 224 Mass. 120, 112 N. E. 609 (1916) (plaintiff allowed to
amend petition in equity to make it suitable for a suit at law, with trial in same court
to obviate delay); Lufkin v. Cutting, 225 Mass. 599, 114 N. E. 822 (1917) (amendment
from law to equity held not to change cause of action).
12. An injunction, for example, theoretically is granted only upon a showing of the
imminence of irreparable damage and the inadequacy of other remedies. But the facts
of an existing controversy are all that need be shown to afford a basis for rendering a
declaratory judgment. See Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. E. 186 (1930) (plain-
tiff's interest in seeking a declaratory judgment of the unconstitutionality of a statute
held established without showing any injury). Hence, the practice is growing to ask for
a coercive remedy, such as an injunction, or a declaratory judgment in the alternative.
The latter remedy can often be granted though the proof falls short of showing a right
to coercive relief. Brownell v. Board of Education, 239 N. Y. 369, 146 N, E. 630 (1929)
(specific performance and declaratory judgment asked; only latter granted); ButterIck
Publishing Co. v. Fulton & Elm Co., 132 Misc. 366, 229 N. Y. Supp. 86 (Sup. Ct. 1928)
(damages and declaratory judgment asked; only latter granted); Greene v. Riordan, 97
Cal. App. 462, 276 Pac. 141 (1929) (money judgment and declaration sought; only latter
granted). Likewise an amendment to the prayer for relief substituting a request for a
declaratory judgment in lieu of the coercive relief originally sought is often allowed.
Tirreli v. Johnson, 171 At. 641 (N. H. 1934) (prayer for injunction amended to prayer
for declaratory judgment).
13. See BoRcAmR, supra note 5, at 10-12, 97 (points 12 and 14), 148, 482-483.
14. See City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co., 209 Cal. 105, 287 Pac. 475 (1930)
(granting injunction when declaratory judgment only was asked for, held error).
15. See BoRcHiAR, supra note 5, at 164-169 and cases there cited.
16. Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 248 N. W. 869 (1933), noted In (1933)
32 MicH. L. Rrv. 112.
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the declaratory judgment and indicates that Massachusetts which has only recently
adopted a declaratory judgment act,' 7 may be expected to regard the remedy not
only as a new and exclusive remedy' 8 but also in its procedurally important function
as an alternative remedy.
LIMITATIONS IN CHARTER PARTY AS AFFECTING POWER OF CHARTERER TO SuBJEcr
VESSEL TO MnRrrnm LmN
Srumin lien law was codified in the Maritime Lien Acts of 1910 and 1920,1
which effected certain important changes in the existing law. -2 Thus, liens for neces-
saries were permitted under the statutes even where the supplies were furnished in
the home port, instead of only when furnished in foreign ports, as was formerly
the law.3 A further change was effected in abolishing the earlier doctrine that
when the owner of the vessel contracted in person for necessaries, or was present
in the port when they were ordered, no lien attached, which reasoning was based
on the presumption that the materialman relied solely on the owner's personal crediL4
Finally, the effect of the Acts was to substitute a single federal statute for conflicting
state legislation, insofar as the state statutes conferred liens for necessaries.5 Tho-a
who are empowered under the Acts to create liens include the managing owner, mas-
17. MAss. GENr. LAws (1932) c. 213, § 3 (10A) empowers courts to promulgate rules
for rendering declaratory judgments. In accordance with the Act, Rule 101 of the Supaior
Courts was promulgated in 1932. The constitutionality of the Act was upheld in White-
side v. Merchants Nat. Bank, 284 Mass. 165, 187 N. E. 706 (1933).
18. The declaratory judgment is even more significant as a new and exclusive rcmsdy
available to relieve the plaintiff from uncertainty and insecurity by allowing him to deter-
mine his rights before committing himself to a possible legal liability. See BorcEra, surpC
note 5, 148, and Part H, c. 1.
1. 36 STAT. 604 (1910), reenacted with amendments in Merchant Marine Act, 41 Svr, .
1005 (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. §§ 971-975 (1926). For a detailed discusion of the Acts,
see Smith, The New Federal Statute Relating to Liens on Vessels (1911) 24 ILav. L. Rv.
182; Griffin, Thre Federal Maritime Lien Act (1923) 37 IT%,v. L. Rnv. 15. For a dis-
cussion of the theory lying behind maritime liens see Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co.
v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U. S. 1, 9 (1920); The Solveig, 103 Fed. 322, 324 (C. C. A.
4th, 1900).
2. See Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co, 254 U. S. 1,
11 (1920); W. A. Marshall and Co. v. S. S. "President Arthur," 279 U. S. 564, 567 (1929).
Outside of these changes, the Lien Acts are merely declaratory of existing maritime law.
3. See cases cited in note 2, supra. A lien arose originally only where the supplies
were furnished in a foreign port, where presumably the owner's credit was not generally
available to the master. See The St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409, 417, 418 (U. S. 1824).
For this purpose, the ports of the several states were treated as foreign to each other,
but no lien could formerly arise for supplies furnished in the home port. See The Roanole,
189 U. S. 185, 193 (1903).
4. See cases cited in note 2, supra. For the rule prior to the Lien Acts, see the St.
Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. 409, 416 (U. S. 1824).
5. See cases cited in note 2, supra. A lien for necessaries furnished in the home port
was formerly authorized by certain state statutes, similar in all respects to the lien of
maritime law. The J. E. Rumbell, 148 U. S. 1 (1893); RhiaoHs o:x AD MnLTY (2d ed.
1920) 112. Whether conferred by maritime or by state law, the lien was enforceable
exclusively in the federal courts. The J. B. Rumbell, supra.
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ter, and "any person to whom the management of the vessel is intrusted;"O and
charterers have been held to come within the scope of this last category.
7 However,
no lien attaches, under the statutes, where the person ordering the necessities was
without authority to bind the vessel therefor, and the supplier knew or by the
exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained this fact.8
The question of authority to invoke a lien was presented in a recent federal dis-
trict court decision.9 A libel to enforce liens under the Act of 1920 was instituted
for oil supplied chartered vessels at the direction of the charterer.10 The vessels
were under time charters, requiring the charterer to "provide and pay for all the
bunker oil," but the libellant apparently was unaware of this stipulation. The court
denied the liens, on the ground that this provision of the charter party negatived
the charterer's authority to invoke a lien on the vessel, and that, since reasonable
investigation would have disclosed the terms of the charter, the libellant was charged
with knowledge of them.
The duty of a materialman to investigate a charterer's authority to render a
vessel liable to liens for supplies is generally held to be affirmative, and not merely
contingent on circumstances putting him on notice.11 Consequently, the materialman
is charged with knowledge of the charter party, if, by reasonable inquiry, he could
have ascertained its provisions.12 This duty of investigation is not satisfied, for
example, by reliance on the statement of a person, in possession of a vessel, that
6. 36 STAT. 604 (§2) (1910); 41 STAT. 1005 (Q) (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 972 (1926).
7. The J. NV. Hennessy, 57 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) (demise charterer); The
Golden Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931) (time charterer), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 682 (1932). A purchaser in possession under a conditional sales contract has been
held to be within this category. The Augusta W. Snow, 46 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931).
8. 36 STAT. 605 (§3) (1910); 41 STAT. 1005 (R)(1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 973 (1926).
The phrasing "knew, or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have ascertained" is taken
from The Kate, 164 U. S. 458 (1896), where the duty of supplier, at maritime law, to
ascertain authority to pledge of master and of charterer is fully discussed. See Smith,
supra note 1, at 193.
9. The Pajala, 7 F. Supp. 618 (E. D. N. Y. 1934).
10. The charterer, of course, is personally liable for the supplies he orders, regardless
of whether a lien attaches. American Warehouse and Trading Co. v. Davison Lumber
Co., 240 Fed. 126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), cert. denied, 243 U. S. 643 (1917); cf. The J. W.
Hennessy, 57 F. (2d) 77, 80 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The Lien Acts allow process either
in personam against the charterer, or in rem against the vessel on which the lien attaches,
and an action against one is not deemed a waiver of right against the other. 36 STAT.
605 (§4) (1910); 41 STAT. 1005 (S) (1920), 46 U. S. C. A. § 974 (1926); The Golden
Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 682 (1932); The
J. IV. Hennessy, 57 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). The liability of the owner for debts
and obligations arising out of the business of the ship or the contracts of the master Is
limited to the owner's investment in the vessel and the value of the freight carried, 23
STAT. 57 (§18) (1884), 46 U. S. C. A. § 189 (1926); American Warehouse and Trading
Co. v. Davison Lumber Co., 240 Fed. 126 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), cert. denied, 243 U. S.
643 (1917). An exception to this limited liability occurs where the owner personally con-
tracts the debt. Great Lakes Towing Co. v. Mills Transportation Co., 1SS Fed. 11 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1907), cert. denied, 207 U. S. 596 (1907); CANMLD AND DALZELL, LAW or Tn
SEA (1921) 116.
11. United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482 (1923); United States v. Robins Dry Dock
and Repair Co., 13 F. (2d) 808 (C. C. A. 1st, 1926).
12. The Dictator, 18 F. (2d) 131 (E. D. La. 1927).
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he is the owner, when in fact he is merely a charterer, and investigation would
have disclosed the terms of the charter party defining his relationship.'3 How~ever,
the duty of investigation is of significance only where the undertaking denies the
power of the charterer to create a lien; therefore, if the charter does not disallow
such a lien, the right to proceed against the vessel is indisputable.14
It is apparent that the principal question involved is that of determining what
effect the specific language of the particular charter party is to have. Charter parties
requiring the charterer "to provide for the upkeep of the vessel" have variously
been construed as permitting and denying power to create a lien.' But where the
charter party requires the character neither to "suffer nor permit to be continud
any lien," some courts have definitely denied a lien,16 relying upon the authority
of a comparatively recent Supreme Court decision. 17 However, in another Supreme
Court case, The South Coast,18 a stipulation to the effect that "the charterer will
save the owner harmless from liens" was interpreted as not prohibiting the impoi-
tion of a lien. Certain lower federal courts have relied on this decision in construing
charter parties, providing "that the charterer shall pay for all supplies," as granting
authority to invoke a lien.19 According to these holdings, the restriction in a
charter party against the power of creating a lien must be an express and unequivocal
statement to that effect in order to be operative against the materialman. 10 How-
ever, there are other lower court decisions which have ieached exactly the opposite
result in holding that the identical provision, "that the charterer shall pay for all
the supplies," negatives his power to pledge the vessel, and that a lien may not
attach under such circumstances.20 These courts have distinguished The South
13. P. H. Gill and Sons Forge and Machine Works v. United State-, 1 F. (2d) 964
(C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
14. The Golden Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
682 (1932).
15. Sustaining a Hen: The Augusta W. Snow, 46 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931);
The J. W. Hennessy, 57 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); The A. S. Sherman, 51 F. (2d)
782 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); The Anna E. Morse, 2S6 Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert.
denied, 262 U. S. 759 (1923); The Golden Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931),
cert. denied, 284 U. S. 682 (1932); The Luddco, 66 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933'.
Denying a len: The Thordis, 290 Fed. 255 (E. D. N. Y. 1923); The Ville De Djibouti,
295 Fed. 869 (E. D. Pa. 1924); The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F. (2d) 423 (D. Ald. 1927);
Curacao Trading Co. v. Bjorge, 263 Fed. 693 (C. C. A. Sth, 1920), cert. denied, 253
U. S. 492 (1920); Pensacola Shipping Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation, 277 Fed. 889 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); The Dictator, 18 F. (2d) 131
(E. D. La. 1927); The Ben Lawers, 42 F. (2d) 897 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
16. United States v. Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co., 13 F. (2d) 803 (C. C. A. 1st,
1926); The S. W. Somers, 22 F. (2d) 448 (D. Md. 1927).
17. United States v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482 (1923).
18. 251 U. S. 519 (1920) (three justices dissenting); see also the same caesz in 233
Fed. 327, 328 (N. D. Cal. 1916).
19. The Augusta W. Snow, 46 F. (2d) 992 (C. C. A. 1st, 1931); The 3. W. Hennessy,
57 F. (2d) 77 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932); The A. S. Sherman, 51 F. (2d) 782 (N. D. X. Y.
1930); The Golden Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S.
682 (1932); The Luddco, 66 F. (2d) 997 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
20. The Thordis, 290 Fed. 265 (E. D. N. Y. 1923); The Ville De Djibouti, 295 Fed.
869 (E. D. Pa. 1924); The Henry W. Breyer, 17 F. (2d) 423 (D. Md. 1927); Curacao
Trading Co. v. Biorge, 263 Fed. 693 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920), cert. denied, 2S3 U. S. 492
(1920); Pensacola Shipping Co. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp-
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Coast decision in two ways. First, the provision to "save the owner harmless from
liens" has been construed as merely a contract to indemnify the owner against any
liens that might attach.21 The provision, therefore, is regarded as impliedly au-
thorizing liens to be imposed. 2' And secondly, the decision has been construed as
a limitation on the power of a master to pledge under a charter party, rather
than on that of a charterer; and thus the decision is said to be inapplicable to facts
such as those of the instant case. 22 These courts, which do not permit liens to
attach, rely instead upon an earlier Supreme Court case, The Kate,2 3 decided prior
to the passage of the Maritime Lien Acts, which, upon facts similar to those in
the present case, denied the authority of a charterer to incur a lien. According to
these courts, The Kate has not been overruled by The South Coast, but is still con-
trolling.
It would seem that the literal meaning of a provision in a charter party that
the charterer is to pay for all supplies is sufficiently suggestive of absence of power
in the charterer to bind the vessel, and that such a provision should place material.
men on notice that, if goods are supplied, they are supplied solely on the credit
of the charterer. However, the fact remains that certain courts have construed
such a stipulation as countenancing the imposition of a lien on the ship. And unless
business custom provides a definite meaning to these words, a possibility which ap-
parently has not yet occurred to the courts, it is reasonable to believe that material-
men likewise may deem the language thus employed as being equivocal. To hold
that such a stipulation forbids the imposition of a lien places the loss resulting from
the charterer's insolvency upon the materialmen, who would then have no recourse
to the vessel, and who, not being parties to the charter party, are powerless to re-
move the ambiguity which is responsible for the resultant merchandising risk. It
appears preferable, therefore, to place the risk of liability for goods supplied on the
owner, for he clearly has the power to prevent ambiguous statement in the charter
party, and to protect himself by so wording the charter party as definitely to deny
the power of a charterer to invoke a lien. To charge a materialman with knowledge
only of such an express limitation on the charterer's power would tend to obviate
the risk of loss involved in such transactions. Under the current diversity of hold-
ings construing charter parties such as that involved in the present case, however,
a lien against a vessel may be varyingly enforced or denied, depending on the par-
ticular circuit jurisdiction in which the claim is presented. Since a libel in rem may
be filed in any district in which the ship can be seized,24 libellants may well seek
to direct their petitions to those circuits favorable to their claims. Requests for
certiorari have hitherto been denied; 25 but it would seem desirable that the Supreme
Court recognize the existence of this conflict of authority, and interpret ambiguous
provisions of this sort as permitting the imposition of a lien.
oration, 277 Fed. 889 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); The Dictator, 18 F. (2d) 131 (E. D. La.
1927); The Ben Lawers, 42 F. (2d) 897 (W. D. Wash. 1930).
21. The Thordis, 290 Fed. 255 (E. D. N. Y. 1923); Curacao Trading Co. v. Blorge,
263 Fed. 693 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 492 (1920); cf. United States
v. Carver, 260 U. S. 482, 489 (1923). But cf. The Luddco, 66 F. (2d) 997, 998 (C. C. A.
9th, 1933).
22. The Thordis; Curacao Trading Co. v. Bjorge, both supra note 21.
23. The Kate, 164 U. S. 458 (1896).
24. 1 BFEimicr om AmmnALTY (Sth ed. 1925) § 239.
25. Curacao Trading Co. v. Bjorge, 263 Fed. 693 (C. C. A. 5th, 1920), cert. denied,
253 U. S. 492 (1920); The Anna E. Morse, 286 Fed. 794 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922), cert. denied,
262 U. S. 759 (1923); The Golden Gate, 52 F. (2d) 397 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 682 (1932).
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RIGHT OF MORTGAGEE TO APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER OF RENTS AD PROITS
THE courts will generally appoint a receiver to collect the rents and profits' of
mortgaged property2 during the pendency of a foreclosure action when the res is
inadequate security and the mortgagor is insolvent.3 This practice4 may be explained,
1. "'Profits' . . . is synonymous with 'rents.'" In re Vedder's Will, 2 Con. 543,
15 N. Y. Supp. 793, SOS (Sur. Ct. 1891); "Rent is . . . compensation which the tenant
makes to the landlord for the use of the premises." Baldwin v. Skeels, 51 Vt. 121,
125 (1878).
2. This note is not concerned with the foreclosure of corporate mortgages by bond-
holders.
3. 7 CAnroDY, NEW YoRx PRAcnci (1932) § 594; 3 Jo.N-Es, MORTcES (8th ed. 1923)
§ 1935; other grounds, id. § 1949; 1 WiLmsrn, MORTGGE FoancosURES (4th ed. 1927)
§ 557, 558; other grounds, id. § 559-582; 3 TnAnir, Irnr PRoPERTY (2d ed. 1920) 2442;
Annotation (1934) 91 A. L. R. 1217 (cases where mortgage provides for appointment
of receiver) ; Annotation (1933) 87 A. L. R. 1008 (cases where there is no such provision) ;
American National Bank v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 89 Fed. 610 (C. C. A.
8th, 1898); Carolina Portland Cement Co. v. Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241 (1930);
Haas v. The Chicago Bldg. Co., 89 Ill. 498 (1878); Shotwell v. Smith, 3 Edw. Ch. 583
(N. Y. 1842); Quincy v. Cheeseman, 4 Sandf. Ch. 405 (N. Y. 1846); Astor v. Tamer,
2 Barb. 444 (N. Y. 1848). For citation of statutes see Comment (1933) 46 HInv. L.
Ray. 491, n. 4. Contra: see cases cited infra, note 27. On the conflict between state ard
federal rules see Comment (1934) 43 Y=r.n L. J. 1027. "It is immaterial whether or not
the mortgage provides for the appointment of a receiver." 3 JoN.Es, Mo=,xRT Es (Sth ed.
1928) § 1930; 7 CAR.oxOy, NEw YORE PRAcrIcE (1932) § 594; Thomson v. Shirley, 69
Fed. 484, 486 (C. C. D. Ore. 1895) ("In a proper case a receiver vill be appointed without
such a stipulation. In no other case should one be appointed."); Durband v. Noy, 196
Iowa 574, 191 N. W. 385, 390 (1923) ("The stipulation . . . does not enlarge the rights
of the parties."); Frank v. Siegel, 263 Ill. App. 316, 322 (1931) ("The request for a
receiver is an appeal to the conscience of the court, and not a demand based upon any
agreement of the parties."); Degener v. Stiles, 6 N. Y. Supp. 474 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Brick
v. Hornbeck, 19 Misc. 218, 43 N. Y. Supp. 301 (Sup. Ct. 1897); Finch v. Ray, 203 App.
Div. 251, 203 N. Y. Supp. 560 (3d Dep't, 1924); Grether v. Nick, 193 Wis. 503, 215
N. W. 571 (1927).
4. The power to appoint receivers of rents and profits is part of the courts' general
equity jurisdiction. 3 JoN-s, MORTGAGES (Sth ed. 1928) § 1930; Cas-edy v. Strauch, 56
F. (2d) 493 (App. D. C. 1932); Bank of Woodland v. Stephens, 144 Cal. 659, 79 Pac.
379 (1904); Pasco v. Gamble, 15 Fla. 562 (1876); Carolina Portland Cement Co. v.
Baumgartner, 99 Fla. 987, 128 So. 241 (1930); Decker v. Gardner, 124 N. Y. 334, 26
N. E. 814 (1891); Sales v. Lusk, 60 Wis. 490, 19 N. W. 362 (1884). The appointment
is discretionary. 3 JoxEs, MORTrAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1930; 1 Wxrs, MORMTG.G ForE-
crosums (4th ed. 1927) § 557; WAI.si, MoRTGAoEs (1934) § 78; Carey and Brabner-
Smith, Studies in Realty Mortgage Foreclosures: III. Receiverships (1933) 27 I.. L.
REV. 717, 719. "The right to foreclose does not carry with it the right to a receiver."
Mercantile Trust Co. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 36 Fed. 221, 224 (C. C. Kan. 1S83);
Carbajal v. Enochs, 68 F. (2d) 169 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934); Chicago Title & Trust Co. V.
M.ack, 347 Ill. 480, 180 N. E. 412 (1932); Lackey v. Yekel, 113 Nab. 382, 203 N. W.
542 (1925); Nicholas v. Perry Co., 11 N. J. Eq. 126 (1856); Verplank v. Carnes, 1 John.
Ch. 57 (N. Y. 1814). The decision of the trial court on the appointment of a receiver
will not be reviewed unless gross abuse of discretion is charged. Briggs v. Neal, 120 Fed.
224 (C. C. A. 4th, 1903). Contra: Skelly Oil Co. v. Aloha Oil Co., 82 Okla. 214, 20
Pac. 537 (1921).
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under the "title" theory,5 on the ground that the mortgagee was himself entitled to
reentry upon default, and consequently when an officer of the court takes possession
in his stead the mortgagor is not prejudiced.( But under the "lien" theory7 the
mortgagor has a legal right to all the incidents of ownership until the consummation
of the foreclosure sale.8 Nevertheless, even in lien theory states, he is divested of
the rents and profits by the equitable remedy of receivership, on the assumption
that this income is part of the collateral for the mortgage debt.0
Moreover, it is frequently said that where the mortgagor operates a business
on the premises instead of leasing them to others, a receiver may be appointed to
operate the business and apply the income to the mortgage debt. 10 Where the
chattels and good will, as well as the land and buildings which the business occupies,
are clearly subject to the mortgage, this result is justified.1 It is the general rule,
however, that property of the mortgagor which is not covered by the mortgage may
not be taken by a receiver, since the mortgagee's interest is coterminous with the
mortgage and the receiver has no higher right.' 2 Thus, where only the realty and
5. For analysis of title and lien theories in each state see 1 JoNs, MORTOAGrS (8th
ed. 1928) § 18-68.
6. Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, 11 N. J. Eq. 39 (1855); see Schreiber v. Carey, 48 WIs.
208, 212 (1880); on the legal relations of mortgagor and mortgagee in general under the
title theory see Comment (1931) 80 U. or PA. L. Rnsv. 269.
7. See Lloyd, Mortgages-The Genesis of the Lien Theory (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 233;
Sycamore Bank v. Tallman, 31 Barb. 201, 206 (N. Y. 1857).
. 8. 1 Wr-TSIE, MORTGAGE FoREwosupEs (4th ed. 1927) § 555; 2 Joxrs, MoRTOAOrs
(8th ed. 1928) § 827; id. § 975; 4 KENT, Comm. (1826) 157; Kountze v. Omaha Hotel
Co., 107 U. S. 378, 393 (1882); Freedman's Savings & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. S.
494 (1888); In re Dooner & Smith, 243 Fed. 984 (D. C. N. J. 1917); Rider v. Bagley,
84 N. Y. 461 (1881); Hollenbeck v. Donnell, 94 N. Y. 342, 347 (1884).
9. See Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 4, at 720: "The receiver Is entitled to
possession of the rents as well as of the property because the rents, upon default, albo
become security for the debt." See cases cited supra note 3. Contra: Marshall &
Ilisley Bank v. Cady, 76 Minn. 112, 78 N. W. 978, 979 (1899) ("A mortgage binds only
the land, and the rents and profits of the premises do not enter into, or form any part
of, the security"); Whitley v. Challis, [18921 1 Ch. 64.
10. 1 JoNES, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) § 1951; Note (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. REv.
315, 320.
11. Cake v. Mohun, 164 U. S. 311 (1896) ("furniture, equipment and other personal
property" of hotel); Pacific Northwestern Packing Co. v. Allen, 109 Fed. 51 (C. C. A.
9th, 1901) (tools, stock, and "outfit" of cannery); First Nat. Bank of San Francisco v.
Detroit Trust Co., 248 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (sawmill plant); Staples v. May,
87 Cal. 178, 25 Pac. 346 (1890) (mine); Knickerbocker v. McKindley Coal & Mining
Co., 172 Ill. 535, 50 N. E. 330 (1898) ("hotel and the furniture and fixtures therein.").
These cases are often erroneously cited for the general proposition that a receiver may
take over any business on mortgaged property. Supra note 10.
12. GLUCK A=n BECKER, REcE Rs or CoPORaxoss (2d ed. 1896) 281; Smith v,
MHcCullough, 104 U. S. 25 (1881); Scott v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 69 Fed. 17
(C. C. A. 8th, 1895); California Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Consolidated Piedmont Cable
Co., 117 Cal. 237, 49 Pac. 1 (1897); Thomas v. Armstrong, 51 Okla. 203, 151 Pac. 689
(1915) (mortgage on undivided one half of printing plant); St. Louis, A. & T. Ry. Co,
v. Whitaker, 68 Tex. 630, 5 S. W. 448 (1887); Campbell v. Lloyd's, Barnett's, & Bosanquet's.
Bank, [18911 1 Ch. 136 n. Contra: Hoover v. Mortgage Co. for America, 290 Fed, 891
(C. C. A. 9th, 1923) (operation of irrigation system necessary to maintain value of land
mortgaged).
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not the mortgagor's business is mortgaged, which is the usual case, allowing a receiver
to operate the business would take from the mortgagor and give to the mortgagee
additional security which was not originally pledged. 13
Nevertheless, this result, which the courts concede they have no jurisdiction to
order directly,' 2 is sometimes accomplished indirectly by identifying the proceeds
of the business with the rents and profits of the real property. When a mortgagor
uses the premises for his own business, however, his income is not the same as rent.
The persons with whom he deals are customers rather than tenants, and they pay pri-
marily for purchased goods and services, not for the use and occupation of leased real
estate. In economic terminology, the gross income of a business comprises, above
the price of raw materials, labor and management, implicit interest on capital in-
vestment and pure profits, as well as implicit rent. The varying proportions of these
components in different enterprises make it difficult to draw the line between those
in which the element of rent predominates and those in which it represents but an
infinitesimal fraction of the receipts. Thus, the practice of appointing receivers for
apartment houses may, perhaps, be supported, viewing the consideration paid by
tenants as, chiefly, rent for the rooms leased to them, rather than the cost of other
conveniences, e. g., elevators, telephone switchboards, and common approaches,
ordinarily provided in such a building. Less like rent, however, are the revenues
derived from the management of a garage, although receivers have been appointed
during the foreclosure of mortgages on such property.1 4 A garage owner does not,
as a rule, assign exclusively to one customer a particular location, as to which be has
all the legal relations inherent in a leasehold interest, such as the power to bring
trespass. And the portion of the receipts allocated for service rather than for space
is larger than the corresponding percentage for apartment buildings. A receiver of
rents and profits has also been authorized to operate a parking lot,15 where small
areas are available temporarily to transient patrons. Here the resemblance to rent
is even more remote, and one who makes use of such facilities could hardly be called
a tenant. A similar liberality in the establishment of receiverships has been displayed
by the courts in actions to foreclose mortgages on hotels,' 6 despite the fact that a
hotel bill is more than a rental fee for rooms alone. Indeed, the law has alvays
recognized a clear-cut distinction between the relation of landlord and tenant, on
13. "The land is in the nature of a pledge; and it is only the land itself-the s scific
thing-which is pledged. The rents and profits are not pledged; they belong to the
tenant in possession, whether the mortgagor or a third person claiming under him.'
Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 392 (1882). "We have, therefore, in the
first instance, to ask, before appointing a manager to manage a businezs, whether the
business is included in the securityY Whitley v. Challis, [1S92] 1 Ch. 64, 70. "The
courts have no business in business." Chatham-Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hotel
Park-Central, Inc., 146 Misc. 208, 261 N. Y. Supp. 490, 492 (S. Ct. 1931).
14. Fairchild v. Gray, 136 Misc. 704, 242 N. Y. Supp. 192 (County Ct. 1930); Title
Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Belgrave Motor Sales Co. Inc., N. Y. L. 3., Feb. 24, 1934,
at 932, col. 4.
15. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Mishol Realty Co, N. Y. L. J., Jan. 27, 1934,
at 441, col. 5.
16. Lowell v. Doe, 44 Mlinn. 144 (1890); Warwick v. Hammell, 32 N. J. Eq. 427
(1880); see Makeel v. Hotchkiss, 190 Ill. 311, 60 N. E. 524, 525 (1901); Fidelity Tu-t
Co. v. Saginaw Hotels, Inc., 259 Mich. 254, 242 N. W. 906 (1932). Contra: Chatham-
Phenix Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Hotel Park-Central, Inc., 146 Mis. 203, 201 N. Y.
Supp. 490 (S. Ct. 1931).
1935] NOTES2
YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44
the one hand, and innkeeper and guest on the other.17 In a recent case, however, the
difference between income from the hotel property and from the hotel business was
recognized for the first time. The receiver was allowed to take only that part of
the revenues which covered the use of rooms actually occupied by guests, rather
than the use of furnishings, lobbies, and other facilities, hotel service, or board.18
This result, although correct in theory, does not commend itself for universal
use wherever the mortgagor operates a business on the mortgaged premises. It is
impossible, in any system of accounting, to separate out of the gross income of a
business that portion which is "earned" by the realty, except by an arbitrary esti-
mate. Consequently, since the true rents and profits are not ascertainable, two
alternatives remain. The courts may permit a receiver to operate the business and
take all of the net profits, or they may refuse to appoint a receiver at all. If the
first course of action be pursued, the mortgagor will be unduly penalized by the
fortuitous circumstance that he conducts a business on his property instead of
leasing it to others, for he will be deprived, not only of that part of the gross
receipts which may be called implicit rent, but of the total proceeds. If receiver-
ship be denied, on the other hand, it may be objected that the mortgagee will be
unduly penalized by the same fortuitous circumstance, since, if the property were in
the possession of a lessee rather than the mortgagor, he would be able to collect the
rent actually paid.19
This objection is grounded on the assumption that the mortgagee should be entitled
17. The common law innkeeper's lien, for example, enables him to hold a patron's baggage
until his bill is paid, BEAL, BAnmm:N's (1900) 322-332; BEALE, INNxEE 'aRs (1906) § 251-280;
cf. IINxEErE s' LABmnz AcT, 26 & 27 Vicr., c. 41 (1863); for all property within the hotel,
except that actually on the person of the guest, is deemed to be in the possession of the pro-
prietor. With the exception of those states where distress survives, 2 TI ANY, LANDLORD &
TENANT (1912) § 325, the landlord has no equivalent privilege. On the same theory of pos-
session, an innkeeper is held liable as bailee or insurer for goods stolen from a guest's room,
BEAr, op. cit. supra, at 302-304, 310, 314; BEAI.E, op. cit. supra, § § 141-155, 181-207.
18. Stadtmuller v. Schorr, N. Y. L. J., Nov. 3, 1934, at 1633, col. 4 (App. Div., 2d Dep't).
Cf. Whitley v. Challis, [1892] 1 Ch. 64: "'Hotel' means the physical building... Would such
a legal mortgage compromise the good will and the business of that hotel? Clearly not, and It
would be impossible ...so to enlarge the subject-matter of the security bargained for.
The security was intended to be confined to the house and buildings ...He [the mort-
gagee] appears to me to be endeavoring to obtain an enlargement of that security, and
to get a benefit to which he is not entitled-a benefit, that is, which he would have
had if he had bargained for a mortgage comprising the good will of the business of the
hotel keeper."
19. It may be argued that a mortgagor in possession should be forced to pay to a
receiver of rents and profits the reasonable value of use and occupation. Astor v. Turner,
3 How. Prac. 225 (N. Y. 1848); Monro-Kings & Grennels Realty Corp. v. Ninth Ave.
& 31 St. Corp., 233 App. Div. 401, 253 N. Y. Supp. 303 (1st Dep't, 1931); Title Guar-
antee & Trust Co. v. Feldon Realty Corp., 149 Misc. 206, 267 N. Y. Supp. 48 (S. Ct. 1933),
This argument was rejected, however, in Holmes v. Gravenhorst, 263 N. Y. 148, 188
N. E. 285, 91 A. L. R. 1236 (1933). The court refused to hold that the mortgagor was
constructively paying rent to himself, declaring that when the mortgagor remained in
possession there were no rents and profits. It has been contended that this decision should
apply to business property as well as to a dwelling house. "It would require a strained
interpretation of the Holmes v. Gravenhorst decision in order to hold that a doctor would
have to pay some rent to a receiver before he could use part of his home as an office,"
Abelow, The Doctrine of Holmes v. Gravenhorst (1934) 3 B'xzxv L. RE.v 212, 223.
to the appointment of a receiver of rents and profits when the mortgagor does not
engage in a business on the premises. But such appointment on the usual grounds
of inadequacy of the security and insolvency of the mortgagor is open to attack.
In these circumstances, it is true, both the proceeds of a judicial sale and a defi-
-ciency judgment against the mortgagor are insufficient to reimburse the mortgagee.
However, in a widespread depression, which makes these two conditions common
occurrences, no reason appears why mortgagees should not be forced to bear their
share of the burden.20 It is an economic truism that the value of the realty, which
is the nominal security for the mortgage, is determined, in the last analysis, solely
by the income which that property is capable of producing. Although the rents
and profits are merely another form of expressing the resale value of the property,
it does not follow that they are, therefore, part of the collateral. Moreover, the
theory that they form part of the security is inconsistent with the fact that a
receiver may not take rents collected by the mortgagor prior to the receivership.
2 '
Furthermore, this doctrine is an anachronistic anomaly. It arose in a period when
rent-usually produce of the soil22 -was considered, literally, as part of the land,
issuing out of it, as the branch of a growing tree.P This conception, however,
has been abandoned in other departments of the law,- 4 and it seems unreasonable
to add to the mortgagee's security, by an outmoded fiction, that which is not, in
any sense, an adjunct of the realty. Finally, the alacrity with which courts in
recent years have granted motions for receivership has created a socially dangerous
accumulation of vast holdings in the hands of small groups of favored receivers
responsible to a few equity judges.2s Even assuming the highest level of quali-
20. This feeling has manifested itself in recent legislation for the relief of mortgage
debtors. See Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1236.
21. N yes v. Rich, 52 Me. 115 (1862), Rider v. Bagley, 84 N. Y. 461 (1831).
22. Co. Lrrr.* 142a ("hens, capons, roses, spurres, bowes, shaftes, h res, hawks, pl.pper,
c=omine, wheat, or other profit.')
23. HoL.ms, THE CommoN LAw (1881) 389-390; 3 HoLDsWOY.,o , A Hxsrony oz
ENG. LAW (3d ed. 1923) 97, 99-101, 151-153; 7 id. (1925) 262, 319; 2 PoLc.. -z-D
MLunTAN, Tin HTsrony or EiG. L.w (1885) 129; Wllams, The Incide ce of Rent
(1897) 11 HAzv. L. R v. 1. The right to distrain, by physically removing chattels from
the premises, illustrates the identification of rent and land. See 7 Hoaoswoixru, A His-
-ToRY oF ENG=SH LAw (1925) 263. Rent, being property, did not come under the rule
of non-assignability of choses in action. Id. at 264-265, S20-527.
24. In suing for rent before the termination of the lease, at common law, only the
real actions could be used, but in 1709, debt or covenant was allowed, and in 1733 a--sumrit
was also made available. 3 Homnswoam, A H SoRY oF ENuisHr Lw (3d ed. 1923)
15-16, 19-20, 99-100, 151; 7 id. (1925) 263, 272. Since rent was to be taken out of the profits
of the land it was not collectible until the end of the term. Id. 267. Hence if the lea--
were terminated before the time for payment no rent was due. 7 Houiswoam, A His-
i'oaY or ENGzLsH LAw (1925) 268; Bank of Pennsylvania v. Wise, 3 Watts 394 (Pa.
1834). This rule was changed in England by 33 & 34 VicT. c. 35 (1870). For the
modern law of apportionment as to time see TirarY, L.Dcrom Am TurAr,-r (1912)
1063-1071. As to amount, see id. 1071-1080.
25. "In the minds of certain New York judges, the old-fashioned distinction between
a receiver of property in a Court of Equity and a receiver of stolen goods at common
law may be said to have been lost." 2 BavcE, AmrERcmr Coi-o,,ws T3x (1911) 637;
see Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 4 at 717, 734; See Carey, Brabner-Smith, and
Sullivan, Studies in Foreclosures in Cook County: II. Foreclosure Methods and Re-
demption (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 595, Tables IV, VI, at 627, 628.
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fication through experience and training, such concentration of authority has, in
many large cities, made management and supervision with 'any degree of efficiency
utterly impossible.
26
Prevention of waste, i.e. misappropriation of rents by nonpayment of taxes and
insurance, failure to make necessary repairs, etc., should be the courts' sole concern
when the mortgagor has defaulted.2 7 This object can be attained, more often than
not, by remedies less drastic than receivership.28 Frequently a mortgagor, in the
hope of eventual financial rehabilitation, will consent to a simple assignment of
rents, whereby he retains the management and accounts to the mortgagee. Usually
the mortgagee will accept this arrangement in lieu of foreclosure, thus protecting
him as fully as if a receiver had been appointed, without resort to the expensive
and cumbersome machinery of the courts, and without irretrievable loss of the
property by the mortgagor. The same result is attained when the parties agree
to the appointment of a disinterested third person as manager, or non-judicial re-
ceiver.21 A bond is acceptable to forestall any type of receivership;80 and where
a mortgagee is thus safeguarded against waste, a receiver will be denied. Some-
26. "The appointment of a receiver . . . necessarily imposes upon the parties in-
interest the expense of the compensation of the receiver and his counsel and generally
other expenses. . .Ordinarily the personal interest of the owners or claimants in pos-
session and their knowledge of and experience with the property and the business enable
and cause them to hold and manage the property and the business with less expense and
more profit than can a receiver." Folk v. U. S., 233 Fed. 177, 185 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
See Carey, Brabner-Smith, and Sullivan, supra note 25, at 601, et seq.; Id,, Tables 1,
II, at 623, 624; Note (1919) 88 C.wr. L. J. 371; Reprint from Chicago Sunday Tribune,
June 19, 1932, STuRGEs, CAsxs AND MATrmIArs oF DEBTRs' EsTAtes (1933) 191.
27. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 107 U. S. 378, 392 (1882); Mercantile Trust Co.
v. Mssouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 36 Fed. 221 (C. C. an. 1888); Nielson v. Heald, 151
Minn. 181, 186 N. W. 299, 26 A. L. R. 33 (1922); Cortleyeu v. Hathaway, 11 N. J, Eq.
39 (1855); Kremer v. Rule, 209 Wis. 183, 244 N. W. 596, 87 A. L. R. 1008 (1932);
see Warren v. Pitts, 114 Ala. 65, 21 So. 494 (1896); Allen, Appointment of Receiver itt
Mortgage Foreclosure Actions (1932) 16 MARQUEtry L. Rxv. 168, at 173 et seq.; Carey
and Brabner-Smith, supra note 4, at 720. In several states receivership to prevent waste
is provided for by legislation. For list of statutes see Comment (1933) 46 Hav. L. Ray.
491, n. 4.
28. Theoretically, the appointment of a receiver in a mortgage foreclosure action is
an extraordinary remedy. Cone v. Combs, 18 Fed. 576 (C. C. Minn. 1883); Rochester
v. Bennett, 74 Mont. 293, 240 Pac. 384, 387 (1925); Larson v. Orfield, 155 Minn, 282,
193 N. W. 453 (1923); Finch v. Ray, 208 App. Div. 251, 203 N. Y. Supp. 560 (3d Dep't,
1924). But, in practice, receivership is granted in almost every case in which it s re-
quested. Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 4, at 723; id. Table VII, at 760. This
practice "is an abuse of the chancery's court's power and has resulted in degrading a
court . .. into a mere collection agency." Id. at 752. See Allen, supra note 27, at
169, 170. The courts' readiness to grant receiverships is due, partly, to the desire to
prevent "milking" of the property by the mortgagor. See Comment (1933) 46 H-Mnv.
L. REv. 491.
29. This is said to be a common device in England. See Carey and Brabner-Smith,
supra note 4, at 733.
30. 1 CLARr, RFcEzvEns (2d ed. 1929) § 62; U. S. v. Dominion Oil Co., 241 Fed. 425
(D. C. Cal. 1917); Buchanan v. Comstock & Parks, 57 Barb. 568 (N. Y. 1865); see
Folk v. U. S., 233 Fed. 177, 183, 185 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916).
times an injunction will be equally efficacious to prevent waste.
31 Finally, since
property is brought under the jurisdiction of the court as soon as the foreclosure
action is begun, the court may, under its contempt power, order the mortgagor
to pay the rents and profits to the clerk of the court, or even to the mortgagee
directly.32 leans are readily available whereby receiverships may, in many mort-
.age foreclosures, be replaced by remedies which are more economical and which
express more accurately the fundamental legal relations involved.
UNiFORm ENFORCEENT OF STOCKHOLDERS STATUTORY LmAu.rrv
For convenience and efficiency in enforcing double liability provisions' against
stockholders the state of New York seeks to utilize the administrative facilities of its
Superintendent of Banks, who is also charged with the supervision of bank liquida-
tion.2 He is empowered to determine the validity and amount of creditor claims, the
value of assets, and thus compute and assess stockholders' liability. Upon failure of a
stockholder to pay the assessed amount within thirty days after receipt of notice, the
Superintendent may sue to collect it; and may introduce his certificate of assessment
'which is to be "presumptive evidence" of the facts it states.
3 Thus, in a simple
manner the determination of the amount of liability is made by an officer who is
presumably expert in the subject; until a suit is brought to collect money allegedly
owed, a stockholder may not contest his liability.
In liquidating the Bank of the United States, which is incorporated in New York,
the Superintendent closed the bank, determined that the deficit would exceed the total
,capital stock, and after notification of assessment, proceeded to enforce a claim against
stockholders in New York and in other states including New Jersey. In New Jersey a
statute enacted in 18974 directs that stockholders' liability arising under the laws of
31. U. S. v. Mlasich, 44 Fed. 10 (C. C. D. La. 1890); Folk v. U. S., 233 Fed. 177, 1S3
(C. C. A: 8th, 1916); Etowah Mlin. Co. v. Wfls Valley lin. & Mfg. C., 106 Ala. 492,
17 So. 522 (1895); Dabney Oil Co. v. Providence Oil Co. of Arizona, 22 Cal. App. 233,
133 Pac. 1155 (1913); Cass v. Realty Securities Co., 144 App. Div. 916, 129 N. Y. Supp.
400 (1st Dep't, 1911).
32. See Carey and Brabner-Smith, supra note 4, at 734. See Folk v. U. S., 233 Fed.
177, 185 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916), quoted supra note 26.
1. N. Y. CoNsr. art. VIII, § 7; N. Y. BANrn= LAW (1914) § 120. For a general
introduction to the subject of double liability, see Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Irdi-
vidual Liability for Corporate Debts (1909) 9 CoL. L. REv. 285.
2. N. Y. BAN=G LAW (1914) § 69. 3. Id. § so.
4. N. J. ComnP. STAT. (1911) tit. IX, § 94b. This statute apparently vms designed
to meet a situation arising from certain provisions in Kansas. Kla.;s. Co:.sr. (IS59) art. XII,
§ 2; KAxs. Gmr. STAT. (1868) c. 23, § 32 et seq. Some of these provisions have b.zn
repealed, except as to banks. KAx. RLv. STAT. ALu. (1923) c. 9, § 156; c. 17, § 810.
Under these provisions a creditor could proceed "by action to charge the stockholders
with the amount of his judgment" against the corporation. Enforcement of an as-arsment
for the benefit of a single creditor against a single stockholder, whose pro rata liability
would not have been ascertained previously, met with resistance in the East. Fowler v.
Lamson, 146 111. 472, 34 N. E. 932 (1893); Bank of North America v. Rindge, 154 M-Ls.
203, 27 N. E. 1015 (1891); Marsnhall v. Sherman, 148 N. Y. 9, 42 NST. E. 419 (IS95);
Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 20 R. I. 466, 40 Atl. 341 (1898). The 'New Jersey
statute may have been prompted by the decision of the New York court in Marshall v.
Sherman, supra. The views adopted in that case, however, were modified by the sube-
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another state may not be enforced except by means of an equitable accounting to
which all the stockholders and creditors of the corporation are necessary parties.
Questioning the constitutionality of this statute, the Superintendent brought an action
at law in which he sought to enforce the liability according to the method provided by
the New York statute. Judgment was given against the Superifitendent.
5
The validity of the New Jersey statute may well be doubted. Compliance with
its terms would have made the task of the Superintendent virtually impossible of
performance for financial reasons, if for no others. The cost of serving all the
stockholders and creditors, totaling over four hundred thousand in number, or of
returning process non inventus est, together with the cost of printing their names,
would have exceeded the amount of the assessments to be collected.( Thus the statute,
in so far as it makes all of them necessary parties, would seem to be sufficiently
unreasonable to violate the due process clause of the Constitution. Yet even if the
New Jersey statute were interpreted to require service of only the New Jersey
stockholders, while service on the Superintendent or the corporation would be suffi-
cient to include the creditors, thus avoiding the burden of expense, the further
question would remain as to whether it would be invalid for the reason that it inter-
feres with the rights of the Superintendent.
The Superintendent contended that his right to enforce the New York provisions
was of such a contractual nature as to command Constitutional protection against
impairment by a state statute.7 In cases involving extraterritorial enforcement, for
the purpose of demonstrating that the actions are transitory, the Supreme Court has
described the obligation as "contractual." 8  The term is used in connection with dis-
quent New York decision of Howarth v. Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489 (1900),
and as a matter of comity New York will permit enforcement of assessments levied under
foreign statutes. Shipman v. Treadwell, 200 N. Y. 472, 93 N. E. 1104 (1911); Stratton
v. Bertles, 238 App. Div. 87, 263 N. Y. Supp. 466 (1st Dep't, 1933); In re Cohen's Estate,
149 Misc. 765, 269 N. Y. Supp. 235 (Surr. Ct., 1933).
5. Broderick v. Abrams, 112 N. J. 309, 170 At. 214 (1934), aff'd, 113 14. J. 305,
174 Atl. 507 (1934). The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court by writ of error
under the name "Broderick v. Rosner". (advice from counsel).
6. According to information received from counsel the aggregate cost would exceed
$600,000.
7. The New York courts hold that stockholders' liability is contractual. Corning v.
McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47 (1847); Lowry v. Inman, 46 N. Y. 119 (1871). Howarth v.
Angle, 162 N. Y. 179, 56 N. E. 489 (1900); Broderick v. Normandie National Securities
Corp., 240 App. Div. 409, 269 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1st Dep't, 1934), aff'd, 265 N. Y. 98,
193 N. E. 310 (1934).
8. Flash v. Conn., 109 U. S. 371 (1883); Whitman v. National Bank of Oxford, 176
U. s. 559 (1900); Hancock National Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640 (1900); Bernheimer
v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516 (1907), followed in Converse v. First National Bank, 212
U. S. 565 (1909); Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912); Seig v. Iamilton, 234
U. S. 652 (1913); Marin v. Angedahl, 247 U. S. 142 (1918); see Shriver v. Woodbine
Savings Bank, 285 U. S. 467, 479 (1932).
Likewise the liability of stockholders in national banks, under the currency laws t12
U. S. C. A. § 62 (1926); derived from the Act of June 3, 1864, c. 106, § 40, 13 Stat.
1111 has been described as contractual. Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498 (U. S. 1869);
Casey v. Galli, 94 U. S. 673 (1876); Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 684 (1897). And in
Deweese v. Smith, 106 Fed. 438, 441-442 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901), aff'd, sub nom Smith v,
Brown, 187 U. S. 637 (1902), the court said the liability was "a contract." But ef,
Christopher v. Nowell, 201 U. S. 216 (1906), where it was held that a married woman
cussion of the scope of the full faith and credit clause to distinguish stockholders'
liability from so called penal obligations, such as taxes, which need not be enforced
extraterritorially 9 The distinction is based on the notion that a penal obligation
arises in spite of the will of the obligor and without premeditation on his part, where-
as the obligation assumed by a stockholder is voluntary in the sense that he could
have avoided it by non-purchase or by timely sale of the stock. The cautious atti-
tude displayed by the Supreme Court in refusing to discuss what specific contract a
stockholder is thought to have made' 0 indicates that the obligation may be considered
contractual for full faith and credit purposes, but that neither the obligation nor the
mode of enforcement is to be protected by the contracts clause. To invoke that
clause would require an implication of contract almost entirely fictional. While
there is some factual basis for the inference that a stockholder both realizes and
agrees that he may be held for double liability in the event of the bank's failure,
there is very little basis for suposing that he was aware of the statutory mode of
assessment, much less that he had agreed to be concluded by it."
Yet even assuming that such a contract could be implied from facts and could
be based upon some finding of intention, the implication would be undesirable. For
it would follow that slight differences in the facts surrounding a purchase, just
as slight differences in the wording of express contracts, might give rise to material
contractual differences with consequent variations in result.' 2 That the theory of
donee of shares of stock was liable for the assessment even though under the law of
Florida, her state, a married woman could not enter into a contract. Cf. also McClaine
v. Rankin, 197 U. S. 154, 161 (1905).
It is thought that the relationship more properly should be referred to as "quasi-con-
tractual.' See Hohfeld, supra note 1, at 316; Shriver v. Woodbine Savings Bank, supra
at 477.
9. Tax and revenue claims generally are not enforceable in foreign jurisdictions. Iefiar,
Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Government Claims (1932) 46 HARv. L. R,'. 193,
215-16. But cf. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657 (1892), defining "penal," for con-
flicts of law purposes, so narrowly that it becomes almost synonymous with "crimina."
Leflar, supra at 204; Corwin, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause (1933) 81 U. or PA%.
L. Rxv. 371, 385.
Somewhat different treatment has been given in the case of a tax claim reduced to
judgment. Thus in People of the State of New York v. Coe Mffg. Co, 10 N. J. Mizc.
116, 162 AtI. 872 (1932), a franchise tax claim was enforced under the full faith and
credit clause, the court treating the obligation as being contractual rather than pznal.
Although the reasoning was criticized unfavorably, the result is approved: Note (1934)
3 MERcER BrEAsLE L. REv. 199; (1933) 18 CoRN. L. Q. 581; (1933) 42 YA.n L. J. 1131.
But see Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co, 127 U. S. 265, 290 (188S). In other situations
it has been held that a public policy hostile to the original cause of action could not b-.
set up as a defense against a foreign judgment, even though the judgment were erroneous.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1907); Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928),
noted in (1928) 28 COL. L. RLv. 659.
10. See the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Bernheimer v. Converse, 205
U. S. 516, 535 (1907).
11. But even if the stockholder were charged on a theory of constructive knowledge,
or estoppel, to whom would the promise have been made? Certainly not to the broker
from whom he secured the shares, or to a donor. If there is any promise to be implied,
it would be to the state, or to the corporate entity, for the benefit of creditors. As to
the protection of corporate creditors in general, see Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors
of Corporations (1923) 36 HMAv. L. REV. 509.
12. See Broderick v. Aaron, 264 N. Y. 368, 374, 191 N. E. 19, 21 (1934).
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implied contract would not produce uniformity in result is illustrated by the prin-
cipal decision. Into the implied agreements said to have been made by the New
Jersey stockholders, the court read the New Jersey statute and held therefore that
it was required by the Constitution to enforce the liability not according to the New
York provisions but according to its own.' 3 It would be impossible to require an
examination into the facts of each purchase, as to where the transaction took place,
what was said, and when in relation to applicable statutes the shares were bought.
Moreover, in the present case, even if the court had been willing to say that all
the stockholders had agreed to the present New York method of enforcement, 14 it
would not have followed that the New Jersey statute would be unconstitutional under
the contracts clause. The statute was in existence in New Jersey prior to the for-
mation of the New York bank, long before the sale of any of its stock, and some
seventeen years earlier than the New York statute in its present form was adopted.
A contract can scarcely be said to be impaired by an antedating statute, whether
the contract is made in the same or in a different jurisdiction.15 There is a further pos-
sible objection in that if the liability is said to be purely a matter of agreement, no
subsequent- objection could be raised by a stockholder that the New York statute was
itself arbitrary. Reasonableness of the method of stockholders' liability enforce-
ment would thus cease to be a matter for court consideration.
13. With respect to a contract of guarinty which defendant, a woman, legally made
in Illinois, and which plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to enforce in Texas, the state of the
defendant's residence, where the law forbade her making such a contract, Mr. Justice
Holmes said, in Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U. S. 412, 416 (1918): "The contract
being a continuing one of uncertain duration the plaintiff had notice that in case of a
breach it probably might have to resort to the defendant's domicile for a remedy, as It
did in fact." Although the applicability of such reasoning to a stockholder's liability
appears highly doubtful, in view of Christopher v. Nowell, 201 U. S. 216 (1906), supra
note 8, nevertheless similar reasoning is used in the principal opinion.
The court in the present case did not consider that a contract embodying the New
Jersey statute might well be ultra vires as to the New York bank, thus raising the posi-
bility that the entire relation would be void. Nor did the court consider that the juris-
diction of the state of incorporation over the corporate entity might be exclusive. In
Chicago and Alton Rr. v. Wiggins, 119 U. S. 615 (1887), the Supreme Court discussed
ultra vires and indicated that a contract, if it were made under a law peculiar to the state
of incorporation, would be entitled to full faith and credit. See Corwin, supra note 9,
at 386. For a case especially applicable to principal case, cf. Aetna Life Insurance Co.
v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924), noted in 38 HARe. L. Rav. 804.
Where a corporation is a party to the contract it is assumed that the laws of the state
of incorporation apply, unless the corporation was chartered to do business in another
state. Pinney v. Nelson, 183 U. S. 144 (1901) ; Thomas v. Matthiessen, 232 U. S. 221 (1913).
14. If the state amends the statute to provide new means of enforcement, the con-
tractual relation between corporation and stockholder is not impaired and the stockholder
is obligated under the amendment. Skinner v. Schwab, 188 App. Div. 457, 463-464, 177
N. Y. Supp. 143, 148 (1st Dep't, 1919) aff'd, 229 N. Y. 549, 129 N. E. 910 (1919),
The question is one of due process rather than impairment of contract. Shriver v. Wood-
bine Savings Bank, 285 U. S. 467 (1932), where, however, it was said, at 473, that if
the remedy had been a part of the contract, the statutory change would have been an
impairment. See also Washington Loan and Trust Co. v. Allman, 70 F. (2d) 282 (C. C,
A. 4th, 1934).
15. Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454, 458 (1891); Diamond Glue Co. v. United States
Glue Co., 187 U. S. 611 (1903); Shawnee Sewerage and Drainage Co. v. Stearns, 220
U. S. 462, 471 (1911).
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A more plausible constitutional objection to the New Jersey provision was de-
rived from the full faith and credit clause.16 The Supreme Court has already in-
dicated that stockholders' liability is a matter within the scope of the full faith and
credit clause and that a foreign state may not refuse to enforce double liability on
the ground of adverse local policy. 17 The subject has been said to be so peculiarly a
matter of internal regulation in the state of incorporation that no other state is
entitled to have a policy regarding it, and the subject includes not simply the statu-
tory double liability but also the statutory manner of determining and enforcing
the liability.' 8  Certainly the terms of the full faith and credit clause as given effect
by the Congressional statute could be interpreted to mean that both the fact of
liability and its method of enforcement abroad should be governed by the New
York provisions in the same way as they are governed in New York itself.
10 In
similar cases where the laws of Kansas and of Minnesota provided that a judgment
against a corporation should conclude the liability of stockholders,0 the full faith
16. U. S. CoNsr. Art. IV, § 1: "Full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Pro-
ceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."
17. Whitman v. National Bank of Oxford, 176 U. S. 559 (1900); Hancock National
Bank v. Farnum= 176 U. S. 640, 643 (1900); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516 (1907);
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243 (1912); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U. S. 652 (1913);
Manin v. Angedahl, 247 U. S. 142 (1918).
18. See Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 260 (1912).
19. Pursuant to the second sentence in the clause, supra note 16, Congress has attempted
to prescribe that the effect to be given subjects coming within the full faith and credit
clause shall be the same as they have by law or usage in the courts or offices of the state,
territory, or country from which they are taken. 1 STAT. 122 (1790); 2 STAT. 293, 299
(1804); U. S. REv. STAT. § 905 (1878), 2S U. S. C. A. § § 687-8 (1926). Although the
method of authenticating legislative acts was prescribed, no mention was made of the
effect to be given statutes. However, it would seem that the certificate of the Superin-
tendent could be included as a "record" or "exemplification" "not appertaining to a court."
While there is much authority for the proposition that Congress has not yet chosen to
declare that all state statutes must be given extraterritorial effect (see infra note 23), it
is noteworthy that double liability statutes, giving proper title to the receivers and the
right to collect assessments, have been treated otherwise (cases supra note 17). It is
thought that this exception is explained best on the ground that the Court considers a
stockholder's relationships with his corporation to be so complex that they ought to he
governed always by the law of the incorporating state, in the same manner as was true
of the fraternal relationship in Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U. S. 544
(1924). Corwin, supra note 9, at 386.
The applicability of the full faith and credit clause to public acts in general has been
-discussed recently in a number of articles. Cook, The Powers of Congres Under She
Full Faith and Credit Clause (1919) 28 YArx L. J. 421, 432; Dodd, Power of the Suprere
Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of Laus (1926) 39 HAR%. L. Rv.
533; Field, Judiciol Notice of Public Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause (1928)
12 M n-. L. Rrv. 439; Langmaid, The Full Faith and Credit Required for Publc Acts
(1929) 24 ILL. L. REv. 383.
20. KX-es. GEzT. STAT. (1868) c. 23, § 32 et seq.; supra note 4. Mnn;. Cosms art. 9,
§ 13(3), and art. 10, § 3. Double liability of stockholders other than in banks or trust
corporations or associations has been repealed. Al.i. STAT. (Mlason, Supp. 1934)
§§ 7465-1, 1690-15. For enforcement provisions see Mn.r. GEN. L#ws (1899) c. 272, § 5;
lswn. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 7699-20 to 25.
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and credit clause was said to require the same result in suits in other states.-"
There is the possible distinction between those cases and the present case in that
a judgment rather than an administrative certificate was there concerned. But in
either situation the documentary finding in question has force against the stockholder
only by virtue of the terms of a statute; in neither instance is the stockholder a
party to the proceeding.22 Thus in both cases the claim would seem to be for rec-
ognition of the statute itself, and statutes have been held to come within the scope
of the clause.
2 3
The extent to which the New York statute is enforceable elsewhere as a matter
of right under the full faith and credit clause may, however, depend upon the further
question of the nature of the provision for the Superintendent's certificate. In a
suit brought against stockholders in Connecticut the court, interpreting an ambiguous
lower court decision in New York,24 said that the certificate was merely prima
facie evidence of the facts stated, that the provision was therefore a matter of
procedure rather than of substantive law, and hence had no extraterritorial force
under the full faith and credit clause.25 This conclusion was reached despite the
21. Whitman v. National Bank of Oxford; Hancock National Bank v. Farnum; Bern-
heimer v. Converse; Converse v. Hamilton; Selig v. Hamilton; Marin v. Angedahl, all
supra note 17. But cf. Hale v. Allison, 188 U. S. 56 (1903); Finney v. Guy, 189 U. S.
335 (1903). -
22. The constitutionality of the Minnesota provisions was sustained in Straw L. E,
Mfg. Co. v. L. D. Kilbourne Boot and Shoe Co., 80 Minn. 125, 83 N. W. 36 (1900);
Finch, Van Slyck & McConville v. Vanasek, 132 Minn. 9, 155 N. W. 754 (1916). Although
stockholders' attendance at the proceeding was a matter within the court's discretion, the
fact that they are "represented" by the corporation is deemed sufficient. Bernhimer v.
Converse; Converse v. Hamilton, both supra note 17. The summary character of the
Minnesota proceeding, the lack of formal pleadings, evidence by affidavit, and the ex parte
order resulting, suggest that it is an administrative determination. See the dissenting
opinion of Justice Clarke in Main v. Angedahl, 247 U. S. 142, 152 (1918). See also
Bernheimer v. Converse, supra, at 533.
23. In the Minnesota cases (supra note 17) full faith and credit was accorded the
statute. "This proposition seems to be necessarily involved in the decision in Converse
v. Hamilton." Dodd, supra note 19, at 550.
Other cases in which the Supreme Court has applied the clause to state statutes are
Royal Arcanum v. Greene, 237 U. S. 531 (1915); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer,
267 U. S. 544 (1924); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken, 266 U. S. 389 (1924); Brad-
ford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932), noted in (1932) 46 R hsv. L. Rhv.
291; (1932) 80 U. or PA. L. Rv. 1139; (1932) 42 YArz L. J. 115. In the Bradford
case Justice Brandeis, at 160, suggests that treatment might differ according to whether
the foreign statute (workmen's compensation) were sought to be applied as a substantive
defense or affirmatively.
Public policy as a defense to actions arising in foreign states has been discussed recently.
Goodrich, Public Policy in the Law of Conflicts (1930) 36 W. VA. L. Q. 156; Lorenzen,
Territoriality, Public Poliy and the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 736; Corn-
ment (1933) 33 COL. L. REv. 508; (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 526. See also, Chambers
v. Baltimore & Ohio Rr., 207 U. S. 142 (1907); Bothwell v. Buckbee Mears Co., 275 U. S.
274 (1927); Clark v. Williard, 292 U. S. 112, 123 (1934), indicating that full faith and
credit may be reduced to the level of comity.
24. Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Misc. 353, 265 N. Y. Supp. 804 (Sup. Ct., 1933).
25. Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 At]. 314 (1934). The court sustained a
demurrer to the complaint because of failure to allege that in fact there was such an
insufficiency of assets as to have made an assessment against stockholders necessary,
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fact that in a previous suit a federal court in Maryland, interpreting the same New
York decision, held the certificate to be conclusive, wherefore the provision was
held to have created a substantive right enforceable in foreign states as a matter
of full faith and credit rather than merely of comity.2O Occasion for such conflicting
treatment would be precluded should the New York courts explicitly construe the
statute, despite its wording, to have created a conclusive presumption,
-° since a
state's interpretation of its own statutes is elsewhere controlling.CS But even though
the provision be construed as creating merely a rebuttable presumptiong in favor of
the Superintendent, it is reasonable to say that the legal relations of the parties
are sufficiently changed, and that the provision is so necessary a part of the New
York liability scheme as to constitute a matter of substance enforceable under the
full faith and credit clause.ao
The fact that a foreign state is bound to enforce double liability statutes as pro-
vided by the state of incorporation, and that its own policy is immaterial,
3 1 does
not mean that the incorporating state can act with complete disregard for the stock-
holders' interests, a result that might follow if the theory of contract were sus-
tained. There remains the consideration of the reasonableness of the stockholders'
treatment, in the light of constitutional due process.
32  In the principal case the
New Jersey stockholders might have claimed exception on the ground that the
New York statute permitting their property rights to be determined by an uncontested
administrative act violates the due process clause.33 It may be argued that the
26. Broderick v. American General Corp., 71 F. (2d) 864 (C. C. A. 4th, 1934). Accord:
Broderick v. Stephano, 314 Pa. 408, 171 AUt. 582 (1934).
27. Such a construction is supported by the fact that the statutory wording was changed
to its present form following the decision in Cheney v. Scharman, 145 App. Div. 456,
129 N. Y. Supp. 993 (2d Dep't, 1911). The change was made in conformity with the
system controlling national banks. See Broderick v. Aaron, 151 Misc. 516, 523, 272
N. Y. Supp. 219, 232 (Sup. Ct. 1934). The national laws (supra note 8) do not specify
whether the Comptroller of Currency's finding is to be condcusve or merely presumptive
evidence, but the federal courts have said that it shall be condushv. Kennedy v. Gibson;
Casey v. Gall; Bushnell v. Leland, all supra note 8.
28. See Royal Arcanum v. Greene; Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, both supra
note 23.
29. "Presumptive evidence" is usually construed to mean prima fade. Broderick v.
McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 At. 314 (1934), and cases cited, id at 98, 174 AUt. at 320.
2 Wroaropj, EvMnacE (2d ed. 1923) § 1356. See Id. at § 1355 concerning the finality
of administrative certificates. On the other hand conclusive presumptions cannot be de-
stroyed by evidence. It is said they are rules of substantive law and not of procedure.
5 Wmroa, EvmncE (2d ed. 1923) § 2492. Bohlen, Rebuttable Presumplions of Lmv
(1920) 68 U. or PA. L. REv. 307, 311; Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presursp!ions
and Burden of Proof (1933) 47 HAsv. L. Rav. 59, 77.
30. The line of demarcation between procedure and substance is, of course, not clear.
Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws (1933) 42 YmxI L. J. 333;
McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws (1930) 78
U. or PA. L. REy. 933.
31. Supra note 17. See also Dodd, supra note 19, at 559.
32. For the opinion, however, that the Supreme Court generally should deal with con-
stitutional questions in the conflicts of law as matters of full faith and credit rAer than
due process, see Dodd, supra note 19, at 550.
33. A state must provide a fair opportunity for submitting the issue of whether a rate
order of a commission is confiscatory to a judicial tribunal for determination as to both
law and facts. Ohio Valley Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287 (1920).
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determination of an individual's liability by an administratve officer would be open
to arbitrary abuse.34 Even a court may not proceed to an adjudication of the rights
of a person who has not been brought within its jurisdiction and been offered an
opportunity to defend himself. 5 Yet in the present case this argument is hardly of
sufficient weight to justify a refusal to enforce the Superintendent's claim. It is
difficult to see how the New York provisions will cause prejudice to stockholders
even though they are not given a hearing. The quasi-judicial act of the Superin-
tendent 36 does not concern only one stockholder, nor merely the absent stock-
holders. It is concerned with a large group, of which a good part resides in New
York, so that the proceeding is a matter of interest to New York citizens. Pre-
sumably an administrative officer will, under such circumstances, proceed with care.
Although the precise issue has not been decided except in a lower New York court,07
the validity of a determination without a judgment has been upheld,38 and provisions
vesting the same or greater power in the Comptroller of Currency with regard to
national banks have been approved for over half a century as being a valid delegation
of judicial power.39
34. Refusal to give full faith and credit to the New York provisions was put on this
ground in Van Tuyl v. Carpenter, 135 Tenn. 629, 188 S. W. 234 (1915).
35. The contractual notion, when used to justify the determination of a stockholder's
liability despite his absence from the proceeding, may be compared with the consent theory
of jurisdiction as applied to automobile cases. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).
See Hinton, Substituted Service on Nonresidents (1925), 20 Im . L. Rnv. 1; Scott, Ju-ris
diction Over Nonresident Motorists (1926) 39 HARv. L. REv. 563.
36. In Deweese v. Smith, 106 Fed. 438 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901) Sanborn, J. said, at 445:
"The comptroller of the currency constitutes a quasi judicial tribunal." It has been said
that the word "quasi" posits an attempt to distinguish the mental attitude of a judge
from that of an administrator. Willis, The Delegation of Legislative And Judicial Powers
to Administrative Bodies (1932) 18 IowA L. REv. 150, 156.
37. Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Misc. 353, 265 9. Y. Supp. 804 (Sup. Ct. 1933). The
Connecticut court in Broderick v. McGuire, 119 Conn. 83, 174 AtI. 314 (1934), favored
the constitutionality of the New York provisions.
38. Van Tuyl v. Scharmann, 208 N. Y. 53, 101 N. E. 779 (1913); Van Tuyl v. Sullivan,
173 App. Div. 391, 156 N. Y. Supp. 309 (2d Dep't, 1915), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 691, 122 N. E.
1078; Skinner v. Schwab, 188 App. Div. 457, 177 N. Y. Supp. 143 (1st Dep't, 1919), afi'd,
229 N. Y. 549, 129 N. E. 910 (1919).
39. Kennedy v. Gibson; Casey v. Galfi; Bushnell v. Leland, all supra note 8. Uhited
States v. Knox, 102 U. S. 422 (1880); In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443 (1897).
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